#### Thought is dialectical – our ability to understand the world is based on reconciling conflicting thoughts into a higher unity

Wood 1 summarizes Hegel, Allen W. Hegel’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/29/16.

Hegel sees traditional Aristotelian logic as an empty, formal discipline; he intends speculative logic to transform it into a science with profound meta­ physical content {EL § 24). Speculative logic will thereby provide a meta­ physical key to the a priori comprehension of all reality, enabling philosophy to encompass and systematize the results of empirical science and give to them an a priori character {EL § 12). In so doing, it will overcome the alien, accidental, and objective form taken by these facts in the modern empirical sciences {EL § 7), exhibiting the inner essence of the objective world as at one with our own freedom as thinkers {EL § 23).1 Hegel thus regards his own philosophical achievement as fundamentally a contribution to metaphysics or "first philosophy."

The lifeblood of Hegel's system of speculative logic is the famous Hegelian dialectic. Hegel's dialectic may be viewed as a highly novel theory of philosophical paradoxes: where and why philosophical thought runs into them, what they mean, how to deal with them. Kant argues that when human rea­ son attempts to extend its cognition beyond the bounds of possible experi­ ence, it not only is tempted to make unwarranted claims to knowledge [and], but also is in danger of falling into contradictions (antinomies); the only way to avoid them is by carefully observing the proper limits of its cognitive powers. The part of this account Hegel retains is the idea that our thinking has an inherent tendency to go beyond every limit, and thus to undermine or over­ throw itself. He associates this idea with the human self's tendency to change, develop, and progress through a process involving a stage of self-conflict fol­ lowed by its resolution.3 Hegel holds that a thought determination is what it is because it is deter­ mined (or limited) in a definite way. But each such thought has an inherent tendency to push beyond its limit and turn into its opposite, resulting in a contradiction. This "dialectic" of thought determinations, as Hegel calls it, is a cause of consternation to the "understanding" - that analytical disposition of thought which tries to grasp thought determinations in their determinacy, keeping them clearly and distinctly separated from one another. For the un­ derstanding, dialectic is a source of scandal and paradox, something to avoid at all costs. But the understanding's efforts are to no avail, because thought itself is dynamic, self-transcending, fundamentally dialectical. Kant realized that thoughts obey the understanding's rules only so long as they remain within their proper bounds. Hegel hastens to add that they have an inherent tendency not to remain confined, a tendency that is as much a part of their nature as the neat analytical definitions within which the understanding wants to confine them. Dialectical paradoxes cannot be avoided, done away with, or treated as mere illusions, as the understanding would wish. They are real, unavoidable, virtually omnipresent. Hegel argues that the proper way to resolve dialectical paradoxes is not to suppress them, but to systematize them. If you become master of them, they can do positive philosophical work for you. Just as thought inevitably gives rise to contradictions, so it also inevitably reconciles them in a higher unity, as a human self that grows through self-conflict proves its growth by emerg­ ing from the conflict into a higher self-harmony. For example, Kant's Second Antinomy opposes the infinite divisibility of the real in space to the indivisi­ bility of its smallest parts (A434/B462). Hegel thinks the antinomy can be resolved by recognizing that the concept of quantity contains within itself both of the opposed determinations, discreteness and continuity (WL 5: 216- 227/190-199; cf. EL § 100). Kant resolves the antinomy by saying that as a mere appearance, matter is neither infinitely divisible nor composed of sim­ ples (A502-507/B530-53 6); Hegel resolves it by saying that matter is both at once. It can be both because our thought may legitimately employ both conceptions involving discreteness and conceptions involving continuity in its theorizing about matter. In effect, Hegel resolves philosophical paradoxes such as the Second An­ tinomy by relying on an idealist or constructivist picture of the relation of theory to reality. If reality is constituted by our thought about it, and that thought systematically involves contrasting (even contradictory) aspects or moments, then reality itself must embody the same contradictions. Contradictory thinking about reality is tolerable if we are capable (via the under­ standing) of distinguishing clearly between the contradictory aspects of our thought, and also (via speculative reason) of reconciling the contradictions in a higher theoretical conception. We might compare Hegel's treatment of philosophical paradoxes with the later Wittgenstein's. Wittgenstein held that contradictions or paradoxes do not "make our language less usable" because, once we "know our way about" and become clear about exactly where and why they arise, we can "seal them off"; we need not view a contradiction as "the local symptom of a sickness of the whole body."4 For Wittgenstein contradictions can be tolerated be­ cause they are marginal and we can keep them sequestered from the rest of our thinking; for Hegel, they arise systematically in the course of philosophi­ cal thought, but they do no harm so long as a system of speculative logic can keep them in their proper place, refusing them admittance to those contexts in which they would do harm. Thus Hegel claims that the old-fashioned logic of the understanding is just a limiting case of speculative logic, which we obtain simply by omitting the dialectical element in thought (EL § 82). The guarantee that contradictions need not ultimately disrupt thinking is provided by the higher unity, in which the opposites are reconciled and the proper place of each is simultaneously determined. For example, the opposition between continuous quantity and discrete quantity leads to a contradiction when we don't realize that the concept of quantity contains both (WL 5: 229/200). Their difference is overcome in the concept of a determinate quantity or a quantum. This concept sets limits to simple continuity, and hence supersedes (aufliebt) the opposition between continuous and discrete quantity (WL 5: 230/201). Hegel has a broader and a narrower conception of dialectic. Sometimes he includes the "positive reason" that "grasps opposites in their unity" within "dialectic" (WL5: 52/56), but sometimes he calls this stage "speculation" or "positive reason," in contrast to "dialectic" or "negative reason" (EL § 82). Negative reason is the activity of reason that drives thought determinations beyond themselves and engenders the contradictions that so plague the un­ derstanding; speculation or positive reason reconciles contradictions in a higher unity, enabling them to be included in a rational system. In the sys­ tem of speculative logic, each thought determination leads to another that opposes it, and that opposition leads in turn to a new determination in which the opposition is overcome. (The regrettable tradition of expounding this theme in the Hegelian dialec­ tic through the grotesque jargon of "thesis," "antithesis," and "synthesis" began in 1837 with Heinrich Moritz Chalybaus, a bowdlerizer of German idealist philosophy, whose ridiculous expository devices should have been forgotten along with his name.5 This triad of terms is used by both Fichte and Schelling, though never to express the Hegelian ideas we have just been examining; to my knowledge, it is never used by Hegel, not even once, for this purpose or for any other. The use of Chalybaus's terminology to ex­ pound the Hegelian dialectic is nearly always an unwitting confession that the expositor has little or no firsthand knowledge of Hegel.) Hegel's speculative logic attempts to run through all basic determinations of thought in a systematic way, assigning each its proper place within the development. At the pinnacle of the system is the "Idea" - thought's ten­ dency to actualize itself by going outside itself. Hegel associates the Idea with the ontological proof for God's existence, since the Idea exhibits the capacity of the highest thought directly to demonstrate its own existence (EL § 64). But the Idea also represents, in religious terms, God's creation of the world. The Idea is thought's proceeding beyond itself to give itself immediate reality in finite, sensuous nature (EL § 244). Hegel's system, comprising the philos­ ophy of nature and philosophy of spirit, attempts to develop the structure of the world of nature and the world of the human mind, using the categories and movement of the system of speculative logic as its key. Nature is thought going outside itself; mind or spirit is its return to itself. As a natural being, the human being, through its awareness of itself as thought, transcends the merely natural to the level of the spiritual. "Spirit" embraces not only "sub­ jective spirit" (or individual psychology), but also "objective spirit" (society or culture, culminating in the political state), and finally "absolute spirit," the realms of art, religion, and philosophy - those forms of higher human culture in which spirit becomes aware of itself as absolute, or the ultimate reality.

Impacts – a. ethics is constructivist since ethical frameworks are solutions to problems that arise, rather than empirical facts b. doubt of one truth does not discount that there is one; skepticism is only a moment in the dialectic, but not the end point. c. Kritiks of the aff that don’t justify another model of truth are self-effacing; to have a correct viewpoint, we need a means of reconciling contradictory views; rejection alone is incomplete.

#### Finding self-certainty through domination of objects is impossible; mutual recognition of the spirit of others within a social order is necessary to reconcile conflicting conceptions of the self to form an identity.

Wood 2 summarizes Hegel, Allen W. Hegel’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/31/16.

We may see Hegel as attempting to supply this deficiency in Fichte's the­ ory. Hegel does not treat [understands] recognition as a transcendental condition for the \* possibility of self-consciousness. He understands it instead as a "process," beginning with a "struggle to the death," and passing through an asymmetri­ cal "master-servant" relation in which one self is recognized by the other without having to recognize the other in turn. In the course of this process, the selves acquire a deeper conception of what it is to be a free self, and the rational outcome of the process is the mutual awareness of free self-conscious -beings as persons with abstract rights. Hegel's model involves a philosophical argument, but it also has historical applications. It attempts to say something about the difference between (modern) societies, which recognize every hu­ man being as a person with abstract rights, and (premodern) societies, which do not. Hegel tries to show that people have a deeper knowledge of their human nature in societies that respect the right of persons than in societies that do not. 83 ￼ABSTRACT RIGHT 5. The desire for self-certainty Earlier we saw that Hegel locates the origin of the concept of a person in ancient Rome. He credits Christianity with extending this status in principle to all, and he finds the worldly application of this Christian view only in the modern state. But Hegel's discussion of recognition, in both his Jena period and his later philosophy of spirit, is not so much an historical account as a rational reconstruction of the process through which the mutual recognition of persons might have developed out of simpler forms of self-consciousness.5 We might think of social contract theories of the state as one analogy for Hegel's procedure, since they, too, are rational reconstructions of the way in which an existing institution might have come about. We would do better, however, to think of the peculiar form of social contract theory found in Rousseau's Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. Hegel's reconstruction, like Rousseau's, does not try to show how individuals might construct a social institution in order to satisfy given ends using given resources. Instead, it attempts to understand how the mutual interaction of individuals fundamen­ tally alters their knowledge of themselves, thereby changing their ends, re­ sources, and their human nature itself. In the Berlin Encyclopedia, Hegel divides the development of "self-con­ sciousness" into three distinct stages: (1) desire (EG §§ 426-429), (2) recog­ nition (EG §§ 430-435), and (3) universal self-consciousness or reason (EG §§ 436-439). Hegel's model begins with human individuals conceived simply as living things possessing "self-consciousness" or "will" (PhG K 165; JR 194/ 99; EG § 426). Hegel follows Fichte in regarding the human self as fundamen­ tally a striving of the "I" against the "not-I," of self against otherness, an im­ pulse to overcome all otherness (W 262/231). Hegel expresses this by saying that self-consciousness is "desire." More specifically, it is a desire to achieve "self-certainty" through overcoming an object or "other." Self-consciousness seeks to destroy the independence or "self-sufficiency" (Selbstandigkeit) of the object, in order to establish its own self-standing independence. Certain of the nothingness of this other, it posits this nothingness for itself as the truth of the other; it negates the independent object and thereby gives itself self- certainty, as true certainty as such, which has become so for it in an objective way. (PhG 11 174) It is in this "nothingness" of the object or other that the desire of self-con­ sciousness finds its "satisfaction" (PhG K 175). For Hegel, the "object" of a desire is never merely a subjective mental state, such as pleasure or the absence of pain. Hegel interprets desire as a function of self-conscious, spiritual being - an embodied being situated in a world of external objects toward which its desires are directed. Further, Hegel interprets this desire in accordance with his theory of spirit as self- actualization through the overcoming of otherness. The fundamental desire that Hegel attributes to self-consciousness is a desire for self-worth or "self- certainty." As spirit, the self engages in an activity of positing an object and then interpreting itself in terms of it. Self-certainty is gained only through 84 ￼RECOGNITION something external, which is brought into harmony with the self, an objectiv­ ity whose independence is done away with or "negated." This negation of the object refers to my using it up or consuming it (as when I literally eat it up), but also includes my shaping or forming it. Even more broadly, it covers any sort of integration of it into my plans and projects. In the most abstract form, it occurs when I assert my dominion over the object in the social forms suitable to property ownership (PR §§ 54-70). The attempt to achieve self-certainty through the appropriation of things proves inadequate. Satisfaction taken in external objects merely leads to a new desire for a new object. This result only points to the fact that the desir­ ing self-consciousness is always dependent on a new object, whereas its aim was rather to establish its own independence, and the nothingness of the object (EG § 428). What self-consciousness needs is an object that brings about this negation within itself without ceasing to be an object. But only a self-consciousness is able to endure the "contradiction" of negating itself or being its own other (PhG 11162). In other words, "self-consciousness reaches its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness" (PhG 1 175). From the standpoint of self-certainty, the fundamental problem with non- human objects of desire is that they can contribute to my self-worth only secondarily or indirectly, by confirming an image of myself that I already have independently of them. Even animals, which are living and conscious objects, cannot provide me directly with a sense of my self-worth, since they possess no conception of a free self, and so I can never find in them a con­ firming perspective on myself. The only "other" that can form a conception of me as a free self is another free self. Self-consciousness can find satisfaction for its desire for self-certainty only when it comes "outside itself," so that its object becomes "another self" (PhG K 179; EG § 429,A). "Self-consciousness has an existence only through being recognized by another self-conscious­ ness" (NP 78); "Self-consciousness is in and for itself insofar and through the fact that it is in and for itself for another, i.e., it is only as something recognized" (PhG 1f 178). When I see my free selfhood reflected back to me out of another self, I actualize my self-consciousness in the form of "spirit," as a "self-restoring sameness." It is only in relation to another free self that I can be truly free, "with myself in another" as regards my self-certainty. Thus the full actualiza­ tion of spirit is possible only through the relation between selves that recog­ nize each other. This is why Hegel even goes so far as to say that the essence of spirit itself lies in recognition, in a community of selves, "the I that is a we and the we that is an I" (PhG 1 177; cf. EG § 43

This interpretation of identity is best A. We exist in the empirical world – others can’t be discarded, they must be incorporated into our self-conception. B. normativity requires we see our actions as limited; objects can used use them as I see fit; only others with relevant ends resist our own ends.

#### The state is the instantiation of conceptual unity – it unites particular interests of individuals with the universal character of obligation

Wood 3 summarizes Hegel, Allen W. Ed: Beiser, Frederick C. The Cambridge Companion to Hegel Edited by Frederick C. Beiser Book DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL05. Hegel's Ethics, p. 211-233. CambridgeUniversity Press. NP 4/23/16.

Max Weber defined the state as the institution that claims a monopoly on the use of violences Since Hobbes, the state has been conceived mainly as a coercive institution: for conservatives a preserver of peace and order, for liberals a protector of individual rights, for radicals a promoter of ruling class interests, but always at bottom an enforcer. What distinguishes Hegel from virtually all other modern social theorists is his view that the state is fundamentally an ethical institution, hence founded not on coercion but on freedom (PR § 257). He sees the source of its strength [is] not in force, but in the way its social structure organizes the rights, the subjective freedom, and the welfare of individuals into a harmonious whole, whose rational unity makes possible each individual's identity as a free person, a moral subject, and a fully self-actualized human being. In ethical action, individuals find their fulfillment, which includes a generous measure of subjective freedom and private welfare but is grounded more deeply on the universal, the state, which is an "unmoved end in itself" (PR § 258). Hegel's view is that individuals, as individuals, can be fully self-actualized and concretely free only if they are devoted to ends beyond their own individual welfare, indeed beyond anyone's individual welfare, to universal or collective ends, which are summed up in the rational organization of the state. The state for Hegel is not a mechanism for the keeping of peace, or the enforcement of rights, or the promotion of any interest beyond its own existence. Instead, it is most fundamentally the locus of the higher collective ends, which, by rationally harmonizing the rights and welfare of individuals, liberate them by providing their lives with meaning. As Hegel conceives of the state, its action on individuals is not the external coercion of policemen, but the internal, ethical disposition that fulfills their rational nature and so makes them free. Hegel does not deny the coercive functions of the state, but he assigns them to the Notstaat or "civil society" - that is, to the economic realm, where persons need external protection for their abstract rights and the market needs regulation to keep it in harmony with the collective needs of the community (PR § 183R). In other words, the state appears as a coercive power only from the fragmented and self-interested perspective of individuals as members of civil society. This is simply because only civil society (the so-called "free market") makes the use of coercive force socially necessary on a large scale. The state's real power, however, always rests on a deeper ethical harmony; only through this can it retain the loyalty and support of individuals, which is the basis of all social life, including the unselfconscious co-operation of civil society, and even of the state's monopoly on violence. Hegel's conception of ethical life thus underwrites a conception of modern social life that is unique among modern theories in its emphasis on spontaneous harmony and free community as a condition for the possibility of all social institutions and relationships. On this conception, a free society is not merely one that protects personal rights and provides for the subjective freedom and welfare of individuals. It is one in which the individual good of its members is brought into rational harmony and grounded in a collective end, which its members understand and pursue both spontaneously and rationally for its own sake. Hegel thought he saw a free and rational community of this kind in the modern state as it actually exists. Most of us, however, cannot share this visfion of our actual social life. For us, modern society remains a battlefield of interests and the state is simply an enforcer, either of some interests over others, or else of the rules of their combat. Thus Hegel's conception of the free society, if it refers to anything, can refer only to a nonexistent freedom, a radically anti-liberal and anti-individualistic ideal of liberation inspiring and haunting our social imagination. From the standpoint of the liberal status quo, however, the same ideal can appear only as a dangerous delusion, one that threatens to deprive us, in the name of freedom itself, of the only sort of freedom we know how to possess. Hegel's ethical thought remains vitally relevant to us because it is still the principal source of those troubled dreams that continue to torment our collective life.

A. The state is an end, not a means, since it defines collective values, rather than maximizing them, B. The rational state cannot be coercive or totalizing – it’s a manifestation of our freedom, rather than a limitation on it. If something prevents you from actualizing yourself, then your rights are not violated, since you had no right to that end initially. C. This takes out state bad Ks – ethical life is about prescribing institutional requirements for society, so the state’s existence is a presupposition – we can not reject it, we can only make demands on it.

Thus the standard actualizing self-consciousness through mutual recognition. To clarify, this refers to the ability to reconcile empirical deficits within an ethical community with universal rights due to all. We must perceive others as actors with valuable ends; this relies on our conceptions of others and ourselves as purposeful.

**Impact calculus:**

1. **The principles that guide the state are the principles that guide actualized individuals – legislation codifies rules that members of the ethical community ought to follow**

Neuhouser 9, Frederick. Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory. Cambridge, US: Harvard University Press, 2009. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 1 April 2016. Copyright © 2009. Harvard University Press. All rights reserved. NP 3/1/16.

This, however, raises a further question: What is the source of the more than merely instrumental ties that citizens are said to have to one another? What kind of attachment in the political sphere substitutes for the bond of love that unites individuals in the family? It is tempting to assume that Hegel's appeal to the idea of national identity implies that the ties among citizens are akin to bonds of brotherhood, having their roots in a prereflective attachment citizens feel to one another by virtue of their all belonging, through birth, to a single people. The ability of citizens to embrace the general will, then, would be parasitic on a lovelike concern they feel for the welfare of their compatriots prior to (independently 00 the dealings they have with one another within the specifically political institutions of their society. Yet Hegel repeatedly emphasizes that there is a fundamental qualitative difference-one that makes the state an instance of mediated rather than immediate unity between the attachments of the family and those within the state. The unity that characterizes the latter, Hegel insists, is not grounded in immediate feeling or any other "bond of nature" (VPRl, 250) but is instead a "union through laws" and therefore a "unity that is known, conscious, expressly pronounced, and thought" (§157N).20 The state, then, embodies the Conceptual moment of mediated unity because the tie that binds citizens together-the bond that endows them with a single will comes into being only through a collective act of legislating reason: in giving itself laws, the state establishes for itself principles that are universally binding, explicitly known, and consciously endorsed through a process of public reflection on the common good. 21 The state, Hegel says, differs from the family in that it "knows what it wills and knows it in its universality, as something thought; it therefore functions and acts in accord with conscious ends, recognized principles and according to laws that ... are present to consciousness" (§270).

This means that A. You care about actions intrinsic to the aff advocacy – i.e. that the state opposes individual ownership of handguns. Individuals can affirm a principle even if it can be misused since that disproves a specific instantiation of the rule, not its truth. B. Misuse of the aff principle represents other deficits within the ethical community, but does not disprove the principle. C. Coercion bad doesn’t answer the aff – it’s a question of whether individuals ought to affirm a world in which they do not possess handguns.

1. Extinction doesn’t turn the aff – if any risk of extinction is possible to overcome extreme injustice we’d abstract away from present injustices by failing to recognize how we are implicated in present structures. The aff is not consequentialist – looking to consequences divorces us from the principles we would affirm since it hands over an action to uncontrollable external forces, unrelated to the initial agent who wills an end.
2. Questioning our present ethical community precludes discussion of future ones – a) dialectical logic means that we find truth when we reconcile conflicting perspectives, so we must overcome present barriers to self-actualization since that opposes ability to conceptualize justice. B) Present wrongs prevent the formulation of future ethical principles. ***And,*** this requires criticism of present aspects of society – the resolution asks whether changes should occur in the status quo legal system, not whether those changes would be lawful.

## Advocacy

#### I defend - Resolved: the United States Federal Government will ban private ownership of handguns by enforcing confiscation and a $500 fine on individuals in possession of handguns. I’ll defend congress if you want me to be more specific.

Jacobs 04 James (Chief Justice Warren E. Burger Professor of Constitutional Law and the Courts Director, Center for Research in Crime and Justice New York University School of Law) Can Gun Control Work? “Prohibition and Disarmament” 2004 Oxford Scholarship Online JW

Perhaps enforcing unpopular, or at least controversial, handgun disarmament could be made easier by setting the punishment low. If illegal possession of a handgun were treated as a misdemeanor or administrative violation, punishable by a small fine, say $250 or $500, jury trials could be avoided altogether. However, under that scheme, people who were (p.165) committed to keeping their handguns would be no more deterred from violating the gun law than from violating the speed limit.

If you want me to specify further, I’ll defend a model of passive enforcement.

## Contention

#### The ability to carry handguns reinforces and is perpetuated by the illusion that freedom is associated with gun ownership – this prevents self-actualization.

Kautzer 15, Chad. (University of Colorado Denver) Good Guys with Guns: From Popular Sovereigntyto Self-Defensive Subjectivity. https://www.academia.edu/11636616/Chad\_Kautzer\_Good\_Guys\_with\_Guns\_From\_Popular\_Sovereignty\_to\_Self-Defensive\_Subjectivity\_Law\_and\_Critique\_26\_2015\_173\_187 8 April 2015. Springer Science. NP 4/7/16.

My students bring guns to class. This is troubling, not only because it poses obvious health risks to others, and to the gun-toting students themselves, but because it is indicative of an emergent and pernicious form of political subjectivity in the United States—one which engenders equally problematic notions of freedom, security and sovereignty. I refer to this subjectivity as self defensive. Its development has less to do with individual protection against criminality than with the defense of a raced and gendered form of autonomy and its ‘metaphysics of domination’ (Brown 1995,p. 6). The rapid liberalization of open- and concealed-carry laws, the proliferation of guns in public spaces and institutions, the reinterpretation of the Second Amendment of the US Constitution, and the abstraction and individuation of the Castle Doctrine in Stand Your Ground laws all contribute to the legalization of non-state violence to defend extra-legal relations of domination. It is therefore not crime that threatens this autonomy, but the perceived failure of the state to protect extra-legal spaces of rule that are necessary for maintaining the social structures of race and gender against gains made by feminist and anti-racist social movements. The newfound urgency in the legislative expansion of the right to self-defense, as well as extremist interpretations of this right, is a response to the threatened collapse of these spaces of domination and thus the means of identity constitution. 1 Since the state is accused of being unwilling to exercise its coercive powers to stabilize these relations of domination as it has in the past, individuals have sought to arrogate such powers to themselves; a privatization of state violence through the quasi-deputization of certain groups. While I argue that the self-defensive subjectivity supported by these develop-ments is new, it did not arise ex nihilo, but rather represents a quantitative-turned-qualitative shift within a long tradition of popular sovereignty in the United States. Historically, popular sovereignty has been predicated on the existence of spaces of lawlessness or states of exception in which private ‘sovereign subjects’ can exercise dominat[e]ion and non-criminal violence, be it over women, LGBTQ people, immigrants, racial minorities, prisoners, or in its most extreme form, slaves. Popular sovereignty, understood as a universal and abstract equality (de jure) among ‘the people’ for self-rule, has always contradicted its (de facto) operations as a mechanism of domination, which divides ‘the people’ (as a ﬁctional body) into actual sub-state relations of rule. The hallmark of this tradition is the disavowal of the social conditions of individual freedom through a process of objectiﬁcation and naturalization. This facilitates the practical relations that constitute the ruler orsovereign subjects through subjugating violence beyond the law. My analysis does not, as Foucault proposed, ‘cut off the King’s head’ (Foucault1980b, p. 121), or fully ‘escape from the juridical sovereignty and State institutions’, to focus instead on ‘the study of the techniques and tactics of domination’ (Foucault 1980a, b, p. 102). While I certainly advocate an analysis of power that focuses on relations of domination, my argument concerns how changes in the juridical mediation and thus facilitation of these relations produce a shift in the techniques and tactics deployed. The aforementioned recent and qualitative shiftin the tradition of popular sovereignty that gives rise to self-defensive subjectivity is the hyper-juridiﬁcation of this sovereign subject. In this case, the subject becomes strategic, and abstract right—whose invocation normally functions as a temporary reprieve from informal normative relations—is made ‘‘the exclusive point of reference for their own relation-to-self’’ (Honneth 2014, p. 87). As a consequence of this passionate attachment to abstract right, which is constitutive of subject formation, the subject has difﬁculty navigating an informal normative order in non-strategic ways and thus can no longer discern the appropriate normative conditions for the exercise of right. This is evidence of a social pathology insofar as the practices of subjects objectively undermine the social conditions of their own freedom, while they are subjectively incapable of comprehending the function of formal right in a larger normative (and informal) order. 2 Freedom is identiﬁed with the right of self-defense and the right of self-defense is identiﬁed with possession of a ﬁrearm. Most signiﬁcant for the diagnosis of a social pathology, there arises the rather peculiar notion that the individual right to self-defense and thus a ﬁrearm needs to be perpetually exercised. This one-dimensional understanding gives rise toa condition in which individuals believe their freedom relies upon carrying a ﬁrearm with them at all times and in all places, hence my armed students and the recent spate of right-to-carry laws.

#### This prevents self-actualization; associating an object with freedom estranges individuals from reality

Fromm 61, Erich, and Thomas Burton Bottomore. Marx's concept of man. Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2004/1961. NP 4/5/16.

The whole concept of alienation found its first expression in Western thought in the Old Testament concept of idolatry. **The essence of** what the prophets call **"idolatry"** is not that man worships many gods instead of only one. It **is that the idols are the work of [one’s] man's own hands -** they are things, **and man [one] bows down and worships things; worships that which** he **[one] has created himself. In doing so [t]he[y] transforms hi[the]mself into a thing. [T]He[y] transfers to the things of his creation the attributes of [their] his own life, and instead of experiencing himself as the creating person, he is [are] in touch with him[them]self only by the worship of the idol.** He has become estranged from his own life forces, from the wealth of his own potentialities, and is in touch with himself only in the indirect way of submission to life frozen in the idols.

The deadness and emptiness of the idol is expressed in the Old Testament: "Eyes they have and they do not see, ears they have and they do not hear," etc. The more man transfers his own powers to the idols, the poorer he himself becomes, and the more dependent on the idols, so that they permit him to redeem a small part of what was originally his. The idols can be a godlike figure, the state, the church, a person, possessions. Idolatry changes its objects; it is by no means to be found only in those forms in which the idol has a so-called religious meaning. **Idolatry is always the worship of something into which man has put his own creative powers, and to which he now submits, instead of experiencing [themselves] himself in his [their] creative act.** Among the many forms of alienation, the most frequent one is alienation in language. If I express a feeling with a word, let us say, **if I say "I love you," the word is meant to be an indication of the reality which exists within myself,** the power of my loving. **The *word* "love" is meant to be a symbol of the *fact* love, but as soon as it is spoken it tends to assume a life of its own,** it becomes a reality. **I am under the illusion that the saying of the word is the equivalent of the experience, and soon I say the word and feel nothing, except the *thought* of love** which the word expresses. The alienation of language shows the whole complexity of alienation. Language is one of the most precious human achievements; to avoid alienation by not speaking would be foolish - yet **one must be always aware of the danger of the spoken word,** that it threatens **to substitute itself for the living experience. The same holds true for** all other achievements of man; ideas, art, **any** kind of **man-made objects. They are man's creations; they are valuable aids for life, yet each one of them is also a trap, a temptation to confuse life with things, experience with artifacts, feeling with surrender and submission.**

Bracketed for gendered language

#### Legal permission to use handguns forces individuals to define themselves in terms of abstract right, rather than their membership of a society with other valuable members

Kautzer 15, Chad. (University of Colorado Denver) Good Guys with Guns: From Popular Sovereigntyto Self-Defensive Subjectivity. https://www.academia.edu/11636616/Chad\_Kautzer\_Good\_Guys\_with\_Guns\_From\_Popular\_Sovereignty\_to\_Self-Defensive\_Subjectivity\_Law\_and\_Critique\_26\_2015\_173\_187 8 April 2015. Springer Science. NP 4/7/16.

The white demographic in the United States is in decline and projected to lose its majority status in less than 30 years. This tendency, together with gains in social, economic and political power by women and racial minorities in the United States over the past 50 years—personiﬁed by the ﬁrst black president sworn into ofﬁce in2008—has contributed to a profound and widespread condition of white anxiety. The state is inevitably reducing the ‘public and psychological wage’ of whiteness about which Du Bois spoke, albeit in ﬁts and starts. This represents the loss of the very foundation of white identity, particularly among poor and working-class whites, and as Wendy Brown notes, ‘aggression is what emerges in the space of unmourned losses’ (Brown 2006, p. 31). Indeed, this is a stubborn, agitated andaggressive form of subjectivity, perpetually suspicious and perceiving threats allaround. For this reason, Hegel’s description of the pathologies of legal freedom arising from normative indeterminacy, rather than Honneth’s, is more ﬁtting(Honneth 2000, 2010, 2014).Honneth views the generation of ‘‘diffused moods of depression or a loss of orientation’’ (Honneth 2014, p. 87) as evidence of a social pathology—somethingsimilar to E´mile Durkheim’s notion of anomie . The notion of normative indeterminacy is taken from Hegel, who argued that it is only through moral duty, rather than legal right, that one is ‘liberated from that indeterminate subjectivity which does not attain existence [ Dasein ] or the objective determinacy of action, but remains within itself and has no actuality’ (Hegel 1991, §149, p. 192). That is, our recognition of normative obligations is a reﬂection of our identiﬁcation with ethical norms and values we share with others. Such recognition is necessary for freedom—what Hegel calls substantial or afﬁrmative freedom—which cannot be achieved through abstract right alone. The latter is what Marx refers to when describing liberty as the ‘separation of man from man’ (Marx 1979, p. 42). This act of separation is a form of deprivation, an expulsion of the social conditions and informal forms of identiﬁcation necessary for social cooperation, communication,and conﬂict resolution. 11 In the Phenomenology of Spirit , Hegel describes the pathology of legal freedom not as melancholic, but as antagonistic and engendering rage within a ‘soulless community’ (Hegel 1977, §477, p. 290), constituted by merely negative relation-ships (Hegel 1977, §482). Rather than being grounded in a number of pre-reﬂexively shared norms and values—i.e. having one’s actions and judgmentsmediated by what Hegel calls ethical substance —the essence of the person is derived from an unmediated identiﬁcation with abstract right. Such persons are thus ‘unfettered’ by social norms, are self-righteous insofar as they have only absolute certainty of their abstract right, and thereby ‘become elemental beings raging madly against one another in a frenzy of destructive activity. Their impotent self-consciousness is the defenseless enclosed arena of their tumult’ (Hegel 1977, §481,p. 292). The externalization and formalization of social relations, inhibiting social recognition, renders the self indefensible —the great paradox of self-defensivesubjectivity, whose fortiﬁcations threaten rather than protect the social conditions of freedom. Subjectively, self-defensive subjects have difﬁculty shifting out of a strategic and rights-centric attitude toward others. The right to bear arms becomes an imperative to bear arms, for there is no alternative, normative framework from which to adjudicate the need to exercise one’s right. From the merely legal point of view, says Honneth, ‘‘they cannot carry out the kind of reﬂection or activity required for realizing their life aims’’ (Honneth 2014, p. 85). Social and institutional spaces where ﬁrearms are prohibited, so-called ‘gun-free zones’, are condemned as an affront to freedom itself, for no other normative considerations or potentiallyconﬂicting rights are taken into consideration. Why one would carry a gun is simply because one has the right to do so—one is able to invoke rights, but not reasons. Asa newly minted Constitutional right, this identiﬁcation of armed self-defense with freedom has produced a wave of legislation facilitating its institutional accommo-dation, from schools, churches and bars, to parks, government buildings, and playgrounds The liberal critique of this development focuses on competing rights and public goods, particularly public health: it is not the right per se, and certainly not its function in rearticulating social structures and identities of race and gender, that are rejected by liberal critics. Given that increased violence is, according to the a forementioned NRA line of reasoning, only evidence of the need for more ‘goodguys with guns’, pitting public health against self-defensive freedom is, politically speaking, a losing battle. What is more troubling, however, is the failure of the Left to resist, much less even articulate a critique of, these social, political, and legislative developments. Such developments are motivated by and contribute to the perpetuation of a political subjectivity, and its related notions of freedom, security and sovereignty, that are antithetical to Left projects. This silence is curious, given that so many recent social movements on the Left have been horizontally organized, marginalizing or completely rejecting rights-centric discourse as well as hierarchical and representational politics. The tendency of these movements has thus been to reinforce non-juridical subject formation and emphasize the physicality of political association and action. The operative form of social recognition in these movements is oriented toward (non-juridical) subject-participants, rather than rights-bearing persons. Arendt’s notion of the spaces of appearance is helpful here, for it captures the intersubjective nature of speech and action as well as the power these generate in the constitution of the polis. Unlike the sheer externality of empirical individuality in the self-defensive subject, intersub- jective obligations and dialogical norms contribute here to the development of radically democratic values. Put another way, in the aforementioned uncoupling of the abstract and concrete movements of political liberalism, the concrete social self is being cultivated in these horizontalist social movements. My suspicion is that the Left’s lack of resistance to self-defensive subject formation is due to a combinationof geographic separation (i.e. horizontalist movements are largely conﬁned to urbancenters) and sympathy for the community defense practices popularized by the Black Panther Party and Deacons for Defense and Justice in the 1960s, whichinvolve very different social relations, forms of identiﬁcation, and thus political subjectivity. If this is correct, then a more developed critique of self-defensive subjectivity than I can provide here will need to take up these concerns in turn.

#### U.S. government’s refusal to acknowledge the need for regulating guns is caused by cowardice and greed

Giroux 15, Henry A. | Murder, Incorporated: Guns and the Growing Culture of Violence in the US. www.truth-out.org/news/item/33127-murder-incorporated-guns-and-the-growing-culture-of-violence-in-the-us October 7th, 2015. NP

It may not be an exaggeration to claim that the US government has blood on its hands because of the refusal of Congress to rein in a gun lobby that produces a growing militarism that sanctions a love affair with the unbridled corporate institutions, financial interests and mass-produced cultures of violence. The Oregon community college shooting is the 41st school shooting this year while there have been 142 incidents of violence on school properties since 2012. Yet, the violence continues unchecked, all the while legitimated by the cowardly acts of politicians who refuse to enact legislation to curb the proliferation of guns or support measures as elementary as background checks - which 88 percent of the American people support - or for that matter, ban large-capacity ammunition magazines and assault rifles. In part, this cowardly refusal on the part of politicians is due to the fact that gun lobbyists pour huge amounts of money into the campaigns of politicians who support their interests. For example, in 2015, the gun lobby spent $5,697,429 while those supporting gun control paid out $867,601. In a New York Times op-ed, Gabrielle Giffords pointed out that the National Rifle Association (NRA) in the 2012 election cycle "spent around $25 million on contributions, lobbying and outside spending." (3) Outside money does more than corrupt politics; it is also responsible for people being shot and killed.

## Underview 1

1. Aff gets 1AR theory- otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive and there’s no way to check against this- meta theory also precedes the evaluation of initial theory shells because it determines whether or not I could engage in theory in the first place. 1AR theory is drop the debater- the 1ARs too short to be able to rectify abuse and adequately cover substance- you must be punished.
2. If the negative debater does not read an advocacy text in the NC, then they must defend the status quo. This is key to fairness, otherwise I’ll never know what you defend until CX, so we need a default.

**Oxford American Large Print Dictionary 8 edited by McKean defines negation of an ought statement**. (Oxford University Press Oxford University Press is a department of the [University of Oxford](http://www.ox.ac.uk/). It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide) [https://books.google.com/books?id=V585\_u2mRG0C&pg=PA1436&lpg=PA1436&dq=The+verb+ought+is+a+modal+verb,+which+means+that,+grammatically,+it+does+not+behave+like+ordinary+verbs.+In+particular,+the+negative+is+formed+with+the+word+not+by+itself,+without+auxiliary+verbs+such+as+do+or+have.+Thus+the+standard+construction+for+the+negative+is+he+ought+not+to+go.+Note+that+the+preposition+to+is+required+in+both+negative+and+positive+statements:+we+ought+to+accept+her+offer,+or+we+ought+not+to+accept+her+offer+(not+we+ought+accept+or+we+ought+not+accept).+The+alternative+forms+he+didn%27t+ought+to+have+gone+and+he+hadn%](https://books.google.com/books?id=V585_u2mRG0C&pg=PA1436&lpg=PA1436&dq=The+verb+ought+is+a+modal+verb,+which+means+that,+grammatically,+it+does+not+behave+like+ordinary+verbs.+In+particular,+the+negative+is+formed+with+the+word+not+by+itself,+without+auxiliary+verbs+such+as+do+or+have.+Thus+the+standard+construction+for+the+negative+is+he+ought+not+to+go.+Note+that+the+preposition+to+is+required+in+both+negative+and+positive+statements:+we+ought+to+accept+her+offer,+or+we+ought+not+to+accept+her+offer+(not+we+ought+accept+or+we+ought+not+accept).+The+alternative+forms+he+didn%27t+ought+to+have+gone+and+he+hadn%25) 27t+ought+to+have+gone,+formed+as+if+ought+were+an+ordinary+verb+rather+than+a+modal+verb,+are+not+acceptable+in+formal+English.+Reserve+ought+for+expressing+obligation,+duty,+or+necessity,+and+use+should+for+expressing+suitability+or+appropriateness.&source=bl&ots=q4\_Cjx9IeB&sig=fYCUV6EmMAZv-jv8P0lDeHa2PI0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAGoVChMIg-6-28DCyAIVSWg-Ch2cxADS#v=onepage&q=The%20verb%20ought%20is%20a%20modal%20verb%2C%20which%20means%20that%2C%20grammatically%2C%20it%20does%20not%20behave%20like%20ordinary%20verbs.%20In%20particular%2C%20the%20negative%20is%20formed%20with%20the%20word%20not%20by%20itself%2C%20without%20auxiliary%20verbs%20such%20as%20do%20or%20have.%20Thus%20the%20standard%20construction%20for%20the%20negative%20is%20he%20ought%20not%20to%20go.%20Note%20that%20the%20preposition%20to%20is%20required%20in%20both%20negative%20and%20positive%20statements%3A%20we%20ought%20to%20accept%20her%20offer%2C%20or%20we%20ought%20not%20to%20accept%20her%20offer%20(not%20we%20ought%20accept%20or%20we%20ought%20not%20accept).%20The%20alternative%20forms%20he%20didn't%20ought%20to%20have%20gone%20and%20he%20hadn't%20ought%20to%20have%20gone%2C%20formed%20as%20if%20ought%20were%20an%20ordinary%20verb%20rather%20than%20a%20modal%20verb%2C%20are%20not%20acceptable%20in%20formal%20English.%20Reserve%20ought%20for%20expressing%20obligation%2C%20duty%2C%20or%20necessity%2C%20and%20use%20should%20for%20expressing%20suitability%20or%20appropriateness.&f=false 1436. Oxford Print Dictionary NP 10/14/15. Published 2008. Eric Mckean.

usage: The verb ought is a modal verb, which means that, grammatically, it does not behave like ordinary verbs. In particular, the negative is formed with the word not by itself, without auxiliary verbs such as do or have. Thus the standard construction for the negative is he ought not to go. Note that the preposition to is required in both negative and positive statements: we ought to accept her offer, or we ought not to accept her offer (not we ought accept or we ought not accept). The alternative forms he didn't ought to have gone and he hadn't ought to have gone, formed as if ought were an ordinary verb rather than a modal verb, are not acceptable in formal English. Reserve ought for expressing obligation, duty, or necessity, and use should for expressing suitability or appropriateness.

Prefer – a) this dictionary dedicates this section to usage, definitions alone can be misinterpreted, b) precision – it contains the word ‘negate’ and ‘ought’ so is most specific to usage and this instance, c) it clarifies that negating an ought statement is logically distinct so your regular definitions don’t apply

1. My framework provides the basis for your criticism – I provide a standard for criticism and social change and advocacy.

Wood 4 summarizes Hegel, Allen W. Ed: Beiser, Frederick C. The Cambridge Companion to Hegel Edited by Frederick C. Beiser Book DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL05. Hegel's Ethics, p. 211-233. CambridgeUniversity Press. NP 4/23/16.

**At no time** in his career **does Hegel regard** just **any social order that happens to exist as "ethical."** A social order, and especially **a state, counts as ethical only in virtue of its rationality** (PR §§145, 258). **To the extent that a social order is not rational, it is also not ethical.** The members of **a social order will not be** generally **fulfilled by** their ethical **duties unless** the **social order** as a whole **is harmonious** and well constituted. Further, reflective individuals will not be able to find their lives in society fulfilling unless their reflection reveals to them the rational structure of their society. **The fundamental aim** of the Philosophy of Right **is to provide a theoretical understanding of this kind for a rational modern state**: "to win for the rational content a rational form" (PR Preface 14). It follows that **ethical virtue and ethical duty are possible for reflective individuals only in a society which is objectively rational.** Only such a society is "ethical" in Hegel's sense of the term. The whole of the Philosophy of Right is Hegel's attempt to articulate these standards of rationality for a modern state. But there are two general criteria of ethical rationality that Hegel applies to societies irrespective of their historical position. First, to be ethical, a social order must be "articulated": it must involve the differentiation of social institutions - the religious realm and the political, the family and the state. (Oriental despotism, for this reason, is considered a pre-ethical form of society [PR § 355, cf. PR § 270R].) Second, ethical life requires the acknowledgement of human individuality as a value. Hegel counts Greek society as the first form of ethical life only because it was among the Greeks that the value of individuality first developed; moreover, because modern society displays the higher flowering of individuality, in the form of persons with abstract rights and subjects with moral freedom, it is more fully ethical than ancient Greece (PR § 150R). **Thus the Hegelian standpoint** of ethical life **does not involve an uncritical acceptance of the existing order, but** rather **a** certain type of **critical reflection on it**. This reflection is **based on** a **comprehension of the rational form of the existing social order in** the **light of** itscultural and historical origins and **its embodiment of progressive cultural values,** such as those associated with *individuality.* ***Hegel intends this*** *kind of reflection* ***to be contrasted with a*** *(****Kantian*** *or Fichtean)* ***moralistic reflection based on*** *principles of* ***a priori reason, or a critique of the existing order*** *that is* ***founded on*** *an* ***abstract (ahistorical) conception of human nature.*** *The ethical as a universal standard. One of the connotations of the term Sittlichkeit is the suggestion, found in the thought of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) and other critics of Enlightenment thought, that different societies and cultures may legitimately have different customs and different norms. This suggestion sometimes prompts Hegel's readers to interpret him as a sort of ethical relativist who regards the accepted norms of every society as valid for the members of that society. This interpretion cannot withstand even the most casual acquaintance with* ***Hegel****'s**actual views. He* ***has no hesitation in condemning*** *certain* ***social practices, such as slavery,*** *and certain provisions of Roman law and morality, such as those that permitted creditors to commit bodily mutilation on their debtors and those that made children the property of their parents (PR § 3). More generally, despite the connotations of the term Sittlichkeit, Hegel's conception of modern ethical life makes strikingly little provision for cultural diversity between modern states.* ***Hegel's Philosophy of Right must be read as a powerful contribution*** *to the argument - directed against the conservative Romanticism of Hegel's age -* ***that the institutions of modern society must be held accountable before the bar of reason.***

1. *Theory precludes your evaluation of the K – a. jurisdiction – you have to vote on arguments that people had equal ability to engage, otherwise they’re not true b. it controls the internal link to your offense – getting the benefits of discussion presumes discussion is possible, c. better theory norms create more productive discussions, which outweigh on scope and longevity since it impacts future rounds.*

## Underview 2

#### Critical movements must be strategically oriented legalistic demands against the state to promote real change.

Zizek 07 Slavoj “Resistance is Surrender” London Review of Books November 15th 2007 <http://www.lacan.com/zizsurcrit.htm> JW

One of the clearest lessons of the last few decades is that capitalism is indestructible. Marx compared it to a vampire, and one of the salient points of comparison now appears to be that vampires always rise up again after being stabbed to death. Even Mao's attempt, in the Cultural Revolution, to wipe out the traces of capitalism, ended up in its triumphant return. Today's Left reacts in a wide variety of ways to the hegemony of global capitalism and its political supplement, liberal democracy. It might, for example, accept the hegemony, but continue to fight for reform within its rules (this is Third Way social democracy). Or, it accepts that the hegemony is here to stay, but should nonetheless be resisted from its 'interstices'. Or, it accepts the futility of all struggle, since the hegemony is so all-encompassing that nothing can really be done except wait for an outburst of 'divine violence' - a revolutionary version of Heidegger's 'only God can save us.' Or, it recognises the temporary futility of the struggle. In today's triumph of global capitalism, the argument goes, true resistance is not possible, so all we can do till the revolutionary spirit of the global working class is renewed is defend what remains of the welfare state, confronting those in power with demands we know they cannot fulfil, and otherwise withdraw into cultural studies, where one can quietly pursue the work of criticism. Or, it emphasises the fact that the problem is a more fundamental one, that global capitalism is ultimately an effect of the underlying principles of technology or 'instrumental reason'. Or, it posits that one can undermine global capitalism and state power, not by directly attacking them, but by refocusing the field of struggle on everyday practices, where one can 'build a new world'; in this way, the foundations of the power of capital and the state will be gradually undermined, and, at some point, the state will collapse (the exemplar of this approach is the Zapatista movement). Or, it takes the 'postmodern' route, shifting the accent from anti-capitalist struggle to the multiple forms of politico-ideological struggle for hegemony, emphasising the importance of discursive re-articulation. Or, it wagers that one can repeat at the postmodern level the classical Marxist gesture of enacting the 'determinate negation' of capitalism: with today's rise of 'cognitive work', the contradiction between social production and capitalist relations has become starker than ever, rendering possible for the first time 'absolute democracy' (this would be Hardt and Negri's position). These positions are not presented as a way of avoiding some 'true' radical Left politics - what they are trying to get around is, indeed, the lack of such a position. This defeat of the Left is not the whole story of the last thirty years, however. There is another, no less surprising, lesson to be learned from the Chinese Communists' presiding over arguably the most explosive development of capitalism in history, and from the growth of West European Third Way social democracy. It is, in short: we can do it better. In the UK, the Thatcher revolution was, at the time, chaotic and impulsive, marked by unpredictable contingencies. It was Tony Blair who was able to institutionalise it, or, in Hegel's terms, to raise (what first appeared as) a contingency, a historical accident, into a necessity. Thatcher wasn't a Thatcherite, she was merely herself; it was Blair (more than Major) who truly gave form to Thatcherism. The response of some critics on the postmodern Left to this predicament is to call for a new politics of resistance. Those who still insist on fighting state power, let alone seizing it, are accused of remaining stuck within the 'old paradigm': the task today, their critics say, is to resist state power by withdrawing from its terrain and creating new spaces outside its control. This is, of course, the obverse of accepting the triumph of capitalism. The politics of resistance is nothing but the moralising supplement to a Third Way Left. Simon Critchley's recent book, Infinitely Demanding, is an almost perfect embodiment of this position. For Critchley, the liberal-democratic state is here to stay. Attempts to abolish the state failed miserably; consequently, the new politics has to be located at a distance from it: anti-war movements, ecological organisations, groups protesting against racist or sexist abuses, and other forms of local self-organisation. It must be a politics of resistance to the state, of bombarding the state with impossible demands, of denouncing the limitations of state mechanisms. The main argument for conducting the politics of resistance at a distance from the state hinges on the ethical dimension of the 'infinitely demanding' call for justice: no state can heed this call, since its ultimate goal is the 'real-political' one of ensuring its own reproduction (its economic growth, public safety, etc). 'Of course,' Critchley writes, history is habitually written by the people with the guns and sticks and one cannot expect to defeat them with mocking satire and feather dusters. Yet, as the history of ultra-leftist active nihilism eloquently shows, one is lost the moment one picks up the guns and sticks. Anarchic political resistance should not seek to mimic and mirror the archic violent sovereignty it opposes. So what should, say, the US Democrats do? Stop competing for state power and withdraw to the interstices of the state, leaving state power to the Republicans and start a campaign of anarchic resistance to it? And what would Critchley do if he were facing an adversary like Hitler? Surely in such a case one should 'mimic and mirror the archic violent sovereignty' one opposes? Shouldn't the Left draw a distinction between the circumstances in which one would resort to violence in confronting the state, and those in which all one can and should do is use 'mocking satire and feather dusters'? The ambiguity of Critchley's position resides in a strange non sequitur: if the state is here to stay, if it is impossible to abolish it (or capitalism), why retreat from it? Why not act with(in) the state? Why not accept the basic premise of the Third Way? Why limit oneself to a politics which, as Critchley puts it, 'calls the state into question and calls the established order to account, not in order to do away with the state, desirable though that might well be in some utopian sense, but in order to better it or attenuate its malicious effect'? These words simply demonstrate that today's liberal-democratic state and the dream of an 'infinitely demanding' anarchic politics exist in a relationship of mutual parasitism: anarchic agents do the ethical thinking, and the state does the work of running and regulating society. Critchley's anarchic ethico-political agent acts like a superego, comfortably bombarding the state with demands; and the more the state tries to satisfy these demands, the more guilty it is seen to be. In compliance with this logic, the anarchic agents focus their protest not on open dictatorships, but on the hypocrisy of liberal democracies, who are accused of betraying their own professed principles. The big demonstrations in London and Washington against the US attack on Iraq a few years ago offer an exemplary case of this strange symbiotic relationship between power and resistance. Their paradoxical outcome was that both sides were satisfied. The protesters saved their beautiful souls: they made it clear that they don't agree with the government's policy on Iraq. Those in power calmly accepted it, even profited from it: not only did the protests in no way prevent the already-made decision to attack Iraq; they also served to legitimise it. Thus George Bush's reaction to mass demonstrations protesting his visit to London, in effect: 'You see, this is what we are fighting for, so that what people are doing here - protesting against their government policy - will be possible also in Iraq!' It is striking that the course on which Hugo Chávez has embarked since 2006 is the exact opposite of the one chosen by the postmodern Left: far from resisting state power, he grabbed it (first by an attempted coup, then democratically), ruthlessly using the Venezuelan state apparatuses to promote his goals. Furthermore, he is militarising the barrios, and organising the training of armed units there. And, the ultimate scare: now that he is feeling the economic effects of capital's 'resistance' to his rule (temporary shortages of some goods in the state-subsidised supermarkets), he has announced plans to consolidate the 24 parties that support him into a single party. Even some of his allies are sceptical about this move: will it come at the expense of the popular movements that have given the Venezuelan revolution its élan? However, this choice, though risky, should be fully endorsed: the task is to make the new party function not as a typical state socialist (or Peronist) party, but as a vehicle for the mobilisation of new forms of politics (like the grass roots slum committees). What should we say to someone like Chávez? 'No, do not grab state power, just withdraw, leave the state and the current situation in place'? Chávez is often dismissed as a clown - but wouldn't such a withdrawal just reduce him to a version of Subcomandante Marcos, whom many Mexican leftists now refer to as 'Subcomediante Marcos'? Today, it is the great capitalists - Bill Gates, corporate polluters, fox hunters - who 'resist' the state. The lesson here is that the truly subversive thing is not to insist on 'infinite' demands we know those in power cannot fulfil. Since they know that we know it, such an 'infinitely demanding' attitude presents no problem for those in power: 'So wonderful that, with your critical demands, you remind us what kind of world we would all like to live in. Unfortunately, we live in the real world, where we have to make do with what is possible.' The thing to do is, on the contrary, to bombard those in power with strategically well-selected, precise, finite demands, which can't be met with the same excuse

#### The state is inevitable- speaking the language of power through policymaking is the only way to create social change in debate.

Coverstone 5 Alan Coverstone (masters in communication from Wake Forest, longtime debate coach) “Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact” Paper presented at the National Communication Association Annual Conference November 17th 2005 JW 11/18/15

An important concern emerges when Mitchell describes reflexive fiat as a contest strategy capable of “eschewing the power to directly control external actors” (1998b, p. 20). Describing debates about what our government should do as attempts to control outside actors is debilitating and disempowering. Control of the US government is exactly what an active, participatory citizenry is supposed to be all about. After all, if democracy means anything, it means that citizens not only have the right, they also bear the obligation to discuss and debate what the government should be doing. Absent that discussion and debate, much of the motivation for personal political activism is also lost. Those who have co-opted Mitchell’s argument for individual advocacy often quickly respond that nothing we do in a debate round can actually change government policy, and unfortunately, an entire generation of debaters has now swallowed this assertion as an article of faith. The best most will muster is, “Of course not, but you don’t either!” The assertion that nothing we do in debate has any impact on government policy is one that carries the potential to undermine Mitchell’s entire project. If there is nothing we can do in a debate round to change government policy, then we are left with precious little in the way of pro-social options for addressing problems we face. At best, we can pursue some Pilot-like hand washing that can purify us as individuals through quixotic activism but offer little to society as a whole. It is very important to note that Mitchell (1998b) tries carefully to limit and bound his notion of reflexive fiat by maintaining that because it “views fiat as a concrete course of action, it is bounded by the limits of pragmatism” (p. 20). Pursued properly, the debates that Mitchell would like to see are those in which the relative efficacy of concrete political strategies for pro-social change is debated. In a few noteworthy examples, this approach has been employed successfully, and I must say that I have thoroughly enjoyed judging and coaching those debates. The students in my program have learned to stretch their understanding of their role in the political process because of the experience. Therefore, those who say I am opposed to Mitchell’s goals here should take care at such a blanket assertion. However, contest debate teaches students to combine personal experience with the language of political power. Powerful personal narratives unconnected to political power are regularly co-opted by those who do learn the language of power. One need look no further than the annual state of the Union Address where personal story after personal story is used to support the political agenda of those in power. The so-called role-playing that public policy contest debates encourage promotes active learning of the vocabulary and levers of power in America. Imagining the ability to use our own arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate. Gerald Graff (2003) analyzed the decline of argumentation in academic discourse and found a source of student antipathy to public argument in an interesting place. I’m up against…their aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing presupposes. It’s as if such students can’t imagine any rewards for being a public actor or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in public will have an effect on the world. Today’s students’ lack of faith in the power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation that led educators for centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57) The power to imagine public advocacy that actually makes a difference is one of the great virtues of the traditional notion of fiat that critics deride as mere simulation. Simulation of success in the public realm is far more empowering to students than completely abandoning all notions of personal power in the face of governmental hegemony by teaching students that “nothing they can do in a contest debate can ever make any difference in public policy.” Contest debating is well suited to rewarding public activism if it stops accepting as an article of faith that personal agency is somehow undermined by the so-called role playing in debate. Debate is role-playing whether we imagine government action or imagine individual action. Imagining myself starting a socialist revolution in America is no less of a fantasy than imagining myself making a difference on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, both fantasies influenced my personal and political development virtually ensuring a life of active, pro-social, political participation. Neither fantasy reduced the likelihood that I would spend my life trying to make the difference I imagined. One fantasy actually does make a greater difference: the one that speaks the language of political power. The other fantasy disables action by making one a laughingstock to those who wield the language of power. Fantasy motivates and role-playing trains through visualization. Until we can imagine it, we cannot really do it. Role-playing without question teaches students to be comfortable with the language of power, and that language paves the way for genuine and effective political activism. Debates over the relative efficacy of political strategies for pro-social change must confront governmental power at some point. There is a fallacy in arguing that movements represent a better political strategy than voting and person-to-person advocacy. Sure, a full-scale movement would be better than the limited voice I have as a participating citizen going from door to door in a campaign, but so would full-scale government action. Unfortunately, the gap between my individual decision to pursue movement politics and the emergence of a full-scale movement is at least as great as the gap between my vote and democratic change. They both represent utopian fiat. Invocation of Mitchell to support utopian movement fiat is simply not supported by his work, and too often, such invocation discourages the concrete actions he argues for in favor of the personal rejectionism that under girds the political cynicism that is a fundamental cause of voter and participatory abstention in America today.

## Extensions

**Wood 1:** though is dialectical since we are aware of both of our ideas, and their limitations. We thus must reconcile conflicting claims into a higher unity to find truth. *Reject arguments not intrinsic to the aff, like consequences – the aff only aims to find one particular truth, i.e. whether handguns should be owned. Your denial of an alternate aspect of society isn’t relevant; it doesn’t speak to the nature of the action, only a contingent problem.*

1. the function of ethics is constructivist –truth is created, not found - this means we have to pick the arguments that enable us to find ethics , since rejection of it is irrelevant.
2. Kritiks of the aff are self-effacing; we need another way to arrive at truth since we can’t solely discard my method *– the permutation is key – incorporate the criticism of the framework into it and make it better. That also means I don't link; deficits to the framework are resolved once observed, since they’re reconciled into higher unity.*

#### Wood 2: We desire self-certainty but can’t find it through acquisition of objects, since objects can only reflect our self-conception back onto ourselves; we need others that can reflect our self-hood back to us: 1. *Arguments about our relations to others always outweigh arguments about our relationship to objects; they can’t justify our obligations; relationships with others preclude.*

This interpretation of identity is best: A. We exist in an empirical world, so we must incorporate others into our self-conception.

B. Normativity means we must see ourselves as limited, but objects can only be used as I see fit; rational others have their own ends so let us conceptualize our ends as restricted, since they can resist us.

**Wood 3:** the state is the instance of conceptual unity; it creates a collective end that enables individuals to unify purposes and recognize the validity of ends beyond their own. *This hijacks the NC – ethical duties can not be fulfilled unless the ethical*

1. The state is not instrumentally valuable in allowing us to acquire certain goods, rather, it is an end.
2. If the principle accepted by the state is one that ought to be accepted by individuals– it’s not a limitation of our freedom.
3. The state must be considered since it creates institutional requirements

The standard is actualizing self-consciousness through mutual recognition. This means that we must reconcile empirical deficits in an ethical community with universal rights due to all; we must perceive of others and ourselves as purposeful.

**Neuhouser 9:** principles that guide the state are ones that guide actualized individuals; legislation ought to codify the ties between individuals

1. You care about what’s intrinsic to the AC – i.e. that the state opposes ownership of handguns. Failure of a principle in a specific instance does not disprove its validity.
2. Misuse of a principle shows that there’s problems in an ethical community, not that there are problems with a principle
3. Coercion bad doesn’t answer the aff – it’s a question of whether individuals should possess a handgun since the principles that govern the state govern individuals.

2) Extinction doesn’t turn the aff – it leads to abstraction from our implication in present structures. Consequences don’t matter – they divorce us from the principles that the agent affirms; the content is defined by external factors.

3) We must question our present ethical community – a) dialectical logic means that we find truth when we reconcile deficits with our present conception and potential opposing ones, b) present wrongs prevent us from finding truth.

We must criticize present aspects of society, so legality is irrelevant.

#### I defend - Resolved: the United States Federal Government will ban private ownership of handguns by enforcing confiscation and a $500 fine on individuals in possession of handguns.

**Kautzer 15:** the ability to carry handguns reinforces and is perpetuated by the illusion that guns promote freedom; it allows creation of extra-legal realms where people can dominate minorities.

**Fromm 61:** associating an object with freedom prevents self-actualization; people confuse the abstract with the empirical

**Kautzer 15:** individuals identify with their right to own and use guns against others, which prevents them from viewing themselves as socially situated.

**Giroux 15:** the government’s refusal to acknowledge the need for gun regulation is caused by corporate greed and self-interest.

# Contention

## Female Self-Defense

#### You, and the NRA need to **stop using survivors** – your defense of gun rights exploits an important issue to push a corrupted political agenda, blame survivors for assault, and manipulate their trauma to sell a product

Ressler to-Culp 15, Tara. Rape Survivors Tell The NRA To Stop Speaking For Them. thinkprogress.org/health/2015/03/16/3633986/college-activists-guns-rape/ MAR 16, 2015. NP 4/9/16.

Activists working to address the rates of sexual assault among college students don’t want gun enthusiasts to co-opt their issue in order to push for more weapons on campus, and have launched several advocacy campaigns to fight back. According to the organization Everytown For Gun Safety, NRA-backed lawmakers in 14 different states — Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Montana, Oklahoma, Oregon, Nevada, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming — have introduced legislation to allow students to carry guns on campus. Seven other states currently allow college students to have weapons on school grounds. Amid larger conversations about how to best address the campus rape crisis, these politicians have recently framed their “campus carry” proposals as policies they believe will keep women safe from potential assaults. One Nevada lawmaker, for instance, recently asserted that “young, hot little girls on campus” need to be armed with guns to prevent themselves from being raped. That’s not sitting well with the anti-rape activists who have been working for years to reform colleges’ sexual assault policies. Members of Know Your IX, a survivor-led group working to address campus violence, have partnered with Everytown for Gun Safety to tell pro-gun lawmakers to back off. “If my rapist had a gun at school, I have no doubt I would be dead,” Landen Gambill, one of the activists working with Know Your IX, wrote in a recent petition aimed at the politicians currently debating proposed campus carry bills. “That’s why I started this petition asking legislators in these states not to allow guns on campuses and put survivors like me in even more danger.” A different petition from the two groups asks supporters to “tell lawmakers to apologize for blaming [survivors] victims of sexual assault, and to stop exploiting campus sexual assault to push the gun lobby’s agenda.” From what we know about the way sexual assault operates on college campuses, adding guns to the mix doesn’t make much sense. Most sexual violence between students takes place under the influence of alcohol among people who already know each other. It’s not clear that college women will actually feel comfortable wielding a firearm against one of their friends. Plus, there’s a lot of empirical evidence suggesting that firearms make sexual assault more deadly for victims. Access to guns increases the risk of homicide in the home. And women are more likely to be shot and killed by an abusive partner than the other way around, even when they’ve purchased a gun for their own protection. That’s why university presidents, college students, and domestic violence experts are all opposed to the idea of allowing concealed weapons on campus. Critics have accused the gun lobby of hijacking an important conversation about campus rape to push their agenda. “This is just a problematic tactic conjured up by the conservative right to use the purity of young women as a bartering chip in the ongoing gun control debate,” one student at Indiana University wrote in a recent op-ed. Representatives for the NRA, meanwhile, haven’t shown signs of backing down. Last week, the organization placed an op-ed written by Amanda Collins, a member of the organization and a rape survivor who says being allowed to carry a gun on campus would have prevented her assault eight years ago. Collins has testified in support of several campus carry bills across the country. And the Nevada politician who made the comment about “young, hot little girls” has stood by her statement, saying that she wants “every citizen, whether they’re on a college campus or not, to have the right to defend him or herself from sexual assault.”

#### Defending women’s right to gun ownership only focuses on women with privilege; you ignore broader struggles of minority communities and ultimately undermining collective empowerment.

Bassin 97, Alana. *Why Packing a Pistol Perpetuates Patriarchy*. Hastings Women’s Law Journal Volume 8 | Issue 2, Article 5. 9/1/1997. (Bassin is a law clerk for the Honorable William A. Neumann, North Dakota Su- preme Court. She is a graduate of Queen's University, Canada, where she received a Bachelor of Honors Commerce and Bachelor of Arts and the University of North Dakota School of Law, where she received her Juris Doctor with distinction.) NP 12/1/15.

Unfortunately, women often perceive the norm in society according to "white, middle class, heterosexual, able-bodied, and otherwise privileged" "As one Los Angeles gang member told Ted Koppel of Nightline, the 88 women who are most interested in gun ownership are privileged women and 89 standards and ignore realities concerning other women. Not surprisingly, not subject to inner city gun violence. Women, however, who pack pistols have more to consider than personal empowerment. Guns in society are taking a heavy [the] toll on lower-income, often non-white, communities. Packing a pistol may promote personal safety, but it does not end the violence in 90 these areas. Women who have a voice in society have a responsibility to address gun oppression on women and people of all races and incomes. Ignoring the impact of gun violence in the inner cities affronts the entire premise of liberty for which women have been fighting.

#### Non-unique and turn – marginalized women don’t have the right to self-defense now; you only legitimize violence against minorities

Arkles 13. Gabriel Arkles. GUN CONTROL, MENTAL ILLNESS, AND BLACK TRANS AND LESBIAN SURVIVAL. (Associate Academic Specialist at Northeastern University School of Law). Southwestern Law Review. Vol. 42. [www.swlaw.edu/pdfs/lr/42\_4\_arkles.pdf](http://www.swlaw.edu/pdfs/lr/42_4_arkles.pdf) (2013). NP 1/4/16.

Because they are overwhelmingly targeted for violence and do not receive institutional protection from this violence, trans people of color and queer women of color are likely to genuinely need to defend themselves and their communities from violence. However, while according to law and public perception self-defense is justified,43 in practice the self-defense justification works more effectively for those accused of crimes against people with less privilege than they have. This dynamic explains why women are punished for fighting back against men who abuse them44 and why hate crime laws are used against the groups they are purported to benefit.45 Certain bodies are considered more worthy defense of than others.46 Famously, Bernhard Goetz, a white man, shot four young Black men he perceived as trying to rob him in a NYC subway.47 While many expressed outrage at Goetz’ racism, others acclaimed him as a hero.48 A mostly white jury acquitted him of murder.49 More recently, George Zimmerman, a mixed race Latino man who was widely perceived as white, shot Trayvon Martin, a young, unarmed Black man, and claimed he acted in self-defense. Zimmerman’s ability to claim self-defense was bolstered by the Blackness of his victim and his own perceived whiteness. Police accepted his account of Martin’s killing as true. Only after widespread public outcry did they question his story, ultimately arresting him for the murder.50 A jury acquitted him.51 Less famously, in the Jersey Seven case, young Black lesbians who defended themselves against an adult Black straight male attacker were promptly arrested and prosecuted.52 The young women were walking along a New York City street when Dwayne Buckle propositioned Patreese Johnson.53 When Johnson said no, Buckle became violent.54 Johnson’s friends came to her aid and they struggled.55 A couple of male bystanders joined the melee, trying to help the women.56 Buckle ended up getting stabbed.57 He recovered after emergency treatment.58 Mainstream media outlets depicted the young women in dehumanizing terms as a “gang of angry lesbians” and “wolf-pack” and reported Buckle’s self-depiction as a victim of a “hate crime” against a straight man.59 The women were the only ones arrested or charged.60 While a number of grassroots groups led by queer and/or trans people of color organized against the prosecution, widespread mainstream public outrage about the case never emerged.61 Johnson served almost eight years for her conviction arising from the incident.62

#### Gun campaigns misrepresent actual difficulties faced by women – the majority of attacks are carried out by someone the woman knows

Bonderman 95, Judith. Armed bv Fear: Self-Defkse Handguns and Women’s Health (Judith Bonderman, JD, MPH Director Advocacy for Victims of Gun Violence Clinic The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law) Spring 1995. Vol. 5, No. 4 NP 12/15/15.

The gun industry’s campaign targets working women and single mothers who think guns will tip the odds in their favor when they are violently attacked by a strange man or an intruder. Ironically, white females, so prominently featured in gun advertisements, are the least likely victims of violence by strangers, and the lowest risk group for firearm deaths. Based on data reported in national crime statistics from 1976 to 1987, the likelihood of a female being killed by a stranger was truly low: four per 1 million person years. l1 The 1992 firearm death rate (homicides, suicides, and unintentional shootings) for white women was 3.6 per 100,000 population, compared with 8.0 per 100,000 for black females, 21.3 per 100,000 for white males, and 63.9 per 100,000 for black ma1es.l Also contrary to the suggestions of the gun advertisements, the greatest threat to the more than 2% million women who experience violence each year comes from within their circle of relatives, acquaintances, and friends, not from strangers. From 1976 to 1987, more than twice as many American - 4 BONDERMAN: HANDGUNS AND WOMEN’S HEALTH WHI Vol. 5, No. 1 Spring 1995 women were shot and killed by their husbands, ex-husbands, or boyfriends as were murdered by strangers’i Similarly, more than two-thirds of all nonfatal crimes of violence (rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault) against women were committed by spouses, family or acquaintances, according to a Department of Justice analysis of 400,000 interviews of crime victims from 1987 to 1991. The average annual rate of female nonfatal victimizations by intimates, family members, and acquaintances was 14.1 per 1,000, compared with 5.4 per 1,000 for incidents in which the offender was a stranger. Females were more than 10 times more likely than men to be victimized by a spouse, ex-spouse, boyfriend, or girlfriend. Only 5% of all violent victimizations against men were family related.12 Earlier Department of Justice studies of violent crime by strangers and nonstrangers had comparable findings. A 1987 report found that most of the violent crimes by strangers (70%) were committed against males, and most crimes by relatives (77%) were committed against females. This study also found that only 4% of stranger to stranger incidents (male or female) occurred inside the victim’s home, compared with 18% of crimes by acquaintances and 58% of crimes by relatives.i3

#### Opposition to firearm regulations is based in patriarchal social norms of hyper-masculinity and social domination – I challenge underlying norms of masculinity

Blumenfeld 15, Warren. Patriarchy, Toxic Hyper Masculinity, & Firearms. <http://goodmenproject.com/featured-content/patriarchy-toxic-hyper-masculinity-firearms-wcz/> November 8th, 2015. NP 12/1/15.

In my attempt to come to an understanding as to why so many people oppose and resist common sense firearms safety regulations, I have developed a proposition that regulations on firearms challenge the promises of a patriarchal system based on notions of hyper-masculinity with the elements taken to the extreme of control, domination over others and the environment, competitiveness, autonomy, rugged individualism, strength, toughness, forcefulness, and decisiveness, and, of course, never having to ask for help or assistance. Concepts of cooperation and community responsibility are pushed to the sidelines and discarded. Recently, to test out my theory, I distributed to a number of Facebook pages my understanding for the reasons why the United States remains among the last of the more developed Western countries to resist instituting meaningful and appropriate firearms safety measures. Coming from the vast majority of sites devoted to enhancing firearms safety, members responded very positively, as if what I proposed was obvious, as common sense, and as indisputable. Examples of comments I received from these sites included: “Spot on analysis,” “Brilliant!,” “You said something I have been thinking for years, but you articulated it so well,” “Thank you for your clarity,” as well as providing some alternative explanations such as: “Follow the Money. Straight to the NRA from Colt, Remington and Smith & Wesson. It is NOT really about the 2nd Amendment for a ‘well regulated militia’; it is about selling weapons to the market of frightened people.”

## Black Self-Defense

### Normalization of Violence First - Prereq

#### Normalization of violence perpetuates systemic oppression and prevents us from questioning the social conditions from which oppression emerges

Giroux 12, by Dr. Henry A. “Colorado Shooting Is About More Than Gun Culture,” www.dailykos.com/story/2012/07/23/1112894/--Colorado-Shooting-Is-About-More-Than-Gun-Culture-by-Dr-Henry-A-Giroux July 23, 2012. NP.

Violence in the United States is a commodity mined for profit, a practice that has become normalized and a spectacle that extends the limits of the pleasure quotient in ways that should be labeled as both pathological and dangerous. We are not just voyeurs to such horrors; we have become complicit and reliant on violence as a mediating force that increasingly shapes our daily experiences. The culture of violence makes it increasingly difficult to imagine pleasure in any other terms except through the relentless spectacle of gratuitous violence and cruelty, even as we mourn its tragic effects in everyday life when it emerges in horrifying ways such as the senseless killing in Colorado. Increasingly, institutions are organized for the production of violence such as schools, prisons, detention centers and our major economic institutions. Rather than promote democratic values, a respect for others and embrace social responsibility, they often function largely to humiliate, punish and demonize any vestige of social responsibility. Our political system is now run by a financial oligarchy that is comparable to what Alain Badiou calls a "regime of gangsters." And as he rightly argues, the message we get from the apostles of casino capitalism carries with it another form of social violence: "Privatize everything. Abolish help for the weak, the solitary, the sick and the unemployed. Abolish all aid for everyone except the banks. Don't look after the poor; let the elderly die. Reduce the wages of the poor, but reduce the taxes on the rich. Make everyone work until they are ninety. Only teach mathematics to traders, reading to big property-owners and history to on-duty ideologues. And the execution of these commands will in fact ruin the life of millions of people."(1) It is precisely this culture of cruelty that has spread throughout America that makes the larger public not merely susceptible to violence, but also luxuriates in its alleged pleasures. We are a country gripped in a survival of the fittest ethic and one consequence is not merely a form of hyper masculinity and a new-found indulgence in the pleasure of violence, but the toxic emergence of a formative culture in which matters of ethics, justice and social responsibility are absent from what it means to create the conditions for a citizenry able to hold power accountable, produce citizens capable of caring for others and offer the conditions for young and old alike to be able to think critically and act compassionately. Justice in the United States has taken a bad hit and its absence can be measured not only in the vast inequalities that characterize all facets of everyday life from the workings of the justice system to the limited access poor and middle-class people now have to decent health care, schools and social protections, but also in a government that separates economics from social costs while selling its power and resources to the highest bidder. America needs to talk more about how and why violence is so central to its national identity, what it might mean to address this educationally and tackle the necessity of understanding this collective pathology of violence not just through psychological and isolated personal narratives, but through the wider ideological and structural forces that both produce such violence and are sustained by it.(2) 1. Alain Badiou, "The Rebirth of History (London: Verso, 2012), p. 13.

Sorkin

### Turns

#### Non-unique and turn – blacks don't have the right to use guns for self-defense now; you only legitimize violence against minorities

Arkles 13. Gabriel Arkles. GUN CONTROL, MENTAL ILLNESS, AND BLACK TRANS AND LESBIAN SURVIVAL. (Associate Academic Specialist at Northeastern University School of Law). Southwestern Law Review. Vol. 42. [www.swlaw.edu/pdfs/lr/42\_4\_arkles.pdf](http://www.swlaw.edu/pdfs/lr/42_4_arkles.pdf) (2013). NP 1/4/16.

Because they are overwhelmingly targeted for violence and do not receive institutional protection from this violence, trans people of color and queer women of color are likely to genuinely need to defend themselves and their communities from violence. However, while according to law and public perception self-defense is justified,43 in practice the self-defense justification works more effectively for those accused of crimes against people with less privilege than they have. This dynamic explains why women are punished for fighting back against men who abuse them44 and why hate crime laws are used against the groups they are purported to benefit.45 Certain bodies are considered more worthy defense of than others.46 Famously, Bernhard Goetz, a white man, shot four young Black men he perceived as trying to rob him in a NYC subway.47 While many expressed outrage at Goetz’ racism, others acclaimed him as a hero.48 A mostly white jury acquitted him of murder.49 More recently, George Zimmerman, a mixed race Latino man who was widely perceived as white, shot Trayvon Martin, a young, unarmed Black man, and claimed he acted in self-defense. Zimmerman’s ability to claim self-defense was bolstered by the Blackness of his victim and his own perceived whiteness. Police accepted his account of Martin’s killing as true. Only after widespread public outcry did they question his story, ultimately arresting him for the murder.50 A jury acquitted him.51 Less famously, in the Jersey Seven case, young Black lesbians who defended themselves against an adult Black straight male attacker were promptly arrested and prosecuted.52 The young women were walking along a New York City street when Dwayne Buckle propositioned Patreese Johnson.53 When Johnson said no, Buckle became violent.54 Johnson’s friends came to her aid and they struggled.55 A couple of male bystanders joined the melee, trying to help the women.56 Buckle ended up getting stabbed.57 He recovered after emergency treatment.58 Mainstream media outlets depicted the young women in dehumanizing terms as a “gang of angry lesbians” and “wolf-pack” and reported Buckle’s self-depiction as a victim of a “hate crime” against a straight man.59 The women were the only ones arrested or charged.60 While a number of grassroots groups led by queer and/or trans people of color organized against the prosecution, widespread mainstream public outrage about the case never emerged.61 Johnson served almost eight years for her conviction arising from the incident.62

#### Access to guns degrades social movements; possession is negatively correlated with a movement’s success

Michel 13, Casey. Owning Guns Doesn't Preserve Freedom. www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/owning-guns-doesnt-preserve-freedom/275287/ April 25, 2013. NP

"This relationship between gun rates and [democracy] isn't based upon social science - it's based upon philosophy," said Aaron Karp, a political science professor at Old Dominion University and one of the Small Arms Survey's senior consultants. "Part of the reason why people who are advocates of individual gun rights tend to be opposed to social science is that they're not comfortable with it." Still, there are those such as Thiess and Mobley who cite America's revolutionary roots as reason enough to warrant our weaponry. The colonies' muskets and blunderbusses were the only things that tossed King George's yoke. If a widely armed populace isn't necessarily required to maintain democracy, then at least it's a requisite for revolution. The data deflates that argument, too, though. As it is, ten nations among the survey's bottom 26 gun owners -- from Niger and Togo to Fiji and the Central African Republic -- have undergone anti-autocracy movements and governmental shifts within the past decade. But only seven nations within the survey's top eighty most-armed nations, including Iraq, have experienced similar movements since 2003. As for the nation with the lowest civilian arms rate in the world? That honor belongs to Tunisia, which sparked the greatest set of pro-democracy revolutions this century. One nation which helps highlight this continued disconnect is Kyrgyzstan, which the survey pegs at 0.9 arms per 100 civilians, or 153rd on the list. The mountainous Central Asian enclave has experienced a pair of democratic revolutions over the past eight years, with 2005's Tulip Revolution overturning longtime president Askar Akayev and installing Kurmanbek Bakiyev, whose corrupt apparatus was later forced out in 2010. A year after Bakiyev's ouster, Kyrgyzstan hosted the first Central Asian election in which the winner was not predetermined. Moreover, the nation currently maintains the best Central Asian rank within Freedom House's tabulations -- all while seeing one of the lowest rates of armed citizenry in the world. "I never linked personal firearm ownership rates and political change in Kyrgyzstan," said Erica Marat, a Central Asian researcher at Johns Hopkins University. "I doubt personal firearm ownership plays any role in the democratization process. This is clearly a purely American line of thought." As it is, the perceived link between the right to arms and democratic freedoms remains strong -- hence, Manchin-Toomey's recent defeat. "The Second Amendment is liberty's teeth," Thiess says. "The First Amendment has no teeth unless we have ability to fight back against repression. And the only way to prevent repression sometimes means taking up arms." In Texan towns and counties now forcing officials to ignore federal statutes, the reality hangs that the only thing keeping Japanese carriers and American Predators from turning their sights toward our mainland are those few clauses still contained within the Second Amendment - data and social science be damned.

#### T – our present gun laws are a manifestation of racism; the tiebreaker should be that blacks want gun control; whites support movements against it

Cutting 15. Gary Gutting, 12-28-2015, "Guns and Racism," Opinionator, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/12/28/guns-and-racism/?\_r=0, accessed 2-4-2016. NP.

The intensity gap exists because opponents of gun violence have no corresponding deep motivation. We cite suicide rates, urban violence, and, especially, mass shootings as horrors requiring more effective gun laws. But few of us actually see guns as existential threats to fundamental American values. In this, however, we are mistaken. Our permissive gun laws are a manifestation of racism, an evil that, in other contexts, most gun-control advocates see as a fundamental threat to American society. We’ve heard a lot recently about how blacks still don’t feel safe in this country. You can argue about how seriously to take complaints from black students at elite universities or even whether outrageous cases of unjustified police shootings are just isolated occurrences. But there’s no argument that black people in the “bad parts” of our cities have to live with utterly unacceptable levels of gun violence. In 2010, blacks, who make up only 13 percent of the population, were 55 percent of gun homicide victims. It’s no surprise that blacks favor stricter gun controls considerably more than whites do. NOW IN PRINT The Stone Reader: Modern Philosophy in 133 Arguments The Stone Reader An anthology of essays from The Times’s philosophy series, published by Liveright. How does racism enter into this picture? Let me put it in personal terms. I spend a fair amount of time in Chicago, where the newspapers regularly offer front-page reports of shootings from the previous night. Checking The Tribune on a recent morning, I learned that two people were killed and a dozen wounded. You might think that a steady stream of such reports (this year, Chicago will have over 2,700 shootings, with over 400 people killed) would induce high levels of fear, especially since many shootings occur on the streets. In fact, I’m not particularly afraid, since — like most Chicagoans — I’m hardly ever where the violence occurs. There’s something to worry about only if you live in certain overwhelmingly black communities on the West and South sides of town. (The papers publish helpful maps showing how the killings are distributed.) These are where almost all the shootings occur, and the large majority of victims (and perpetrators) are black. The patterns are similar in other large American cities, so that those who live with gun violence as an imminent, personal threat are mostly black. But imagine if there regularly were shootings in previously “safe” white areas. Now there are frequent killings on the Magnificent Mile, the Gold Coast and in Lincoln Park. Both the perpetrators and the victims are white, and, despite greatly increased police protection, the violence continues. Given the strong support for gun control among residents of these areas, the cause would quickly become very personal. Chicago has relatively strong gun laws, but the city borders on Indiana, where the laws are much laxer. My neighbors and I would join a vigorous and relentless campaign for stricter national gun laws. This isn’t our reaction to gun violence in black parts of town. Does this mean that we’re racists? Perhaps not. Perhaps we just haven’t realized the extent to which gun violence is destroying urban black communities. But once we realize this, our passion for justice and hatred of racism should galvanize us to action. Here the parallel to the Black Lives Matter movement is instructive. When black protesters convinced whites that striking examples of unjustified police violence were not just occasional aberrations, the whites supported protests against what they now saw as a racist practice. Similarly, white supporters of gun control should join with blacks — including mayors of major cities — who have recognized the racist effects of gun proliferation. RELATED More From The Stone Read previous contributions to this series. The case for the racist effect of our permissive gun laws is especially powerful. There’s no way of explaining away all these deaths as aberrations. If we fail to oppose with equal passion and vigor the relentless political pressure of (mostly white) gun advocates, we force a large number of black citizens to live with the constant threat of gun violence. We’re in effect letting the Second Amendment trump the Fourteenth Amendment, implicitly preferring the right of gun ownership to the right of black people to live free from fear. The gun lobby, of course, will say that gun control laws won’t help. Some will also dismiss gun violence as a “black problem” since it’s often a matter of blacks attacking other blacks. But here I’m not concerned with refuting gun-lobby arguments. I’m speaking to those who already agree that we need stronger gun laws and who realize that when our fellow citizens are dying and there’s something we can do about it, it’s morally vacant to say it’s their problem. Hatred of racism should be a major motivation for the gun control movement. This will give [gun control] it the vigor and persistence needed to overcome the gun lobby’s passionate fantasy that citizens with guns protect us from tyranny.

# Framework Answers

### A2 Fallacy of Origin

1. Creation of a community is a continuous and renewed process; in order to form ethics in this instant we must go thorugh the process of the Aff
2. Only a state structured in the same way as the aff can find truth; any policy in order to exist must be consistent with the form of the ethical community in order to be actual – that’s **Wood**

### A2 People can live outside of the community

1. State obligations pertain to their responsibilities in relation to individuals within the state – the capacity for people to fall outside of the state’s responsibility doesn’t indict the framework, it just indicts that individual’s relevance to it
2. Ethical frameworks with relation to government are necessarily intersubjective, so if your framework functions without intersubjectivity you reject it

# Framework Interaction

## Coherentism

#### Ordinary language is subject to corruption and can not be the basis of ethics since it is in need of philosophical correction

Wood 90 summarizes Hegel, Allen W. *Hegel’s Ethical Thought.* Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/29/16.

Hegel makes it plain that for philosophical purposes, the technical mean­ ing should always be primary. Hegel takes himself to be engaging in the uniquely philosophical task of deducing or developing categories or thought- determinations out of one another. He believes that the system of philosophi­ cal categories is in fact "stored in language," and hence (perhaps to our as­ tonishment) Hegel denies that philosophy needs any special terminology (WL 5: 20/31-32). At the same time, he realizes that ordinary language re­ flects ordinary thinking, which is often confused, shallow, and erroneous, in need of philosophical correction. Appeals to ordinary usage are therefore entirely out of place in philosophy. "Rather the main thing in philosophical cognition is the necessity of the concept, and the process of having come to be as a result [is] its proof and deduction. Since the content is necessary for 72 ￼HAPPINESS itself, the second thing is to look around for what corresponds to it in [ordi­ nary] conceptions and language" (PR § 2R).

## Constitutionality

#### Framework overview: This devolves to the AC: A. Contracts are only in a legitimate in a society where people have the ability to consent; for example, if I put a gun to your head you would not be bound to what you said – restrictions on ability to format identity in the squo mean the current constitution can’t bind action. B. The Constitution must be interpreted so the NC just begs the question – we ought to interpret it consistently with the AC framework.

#### The Second Amendment is a tool to impose patriarchal norms – women were never included in its framing

Bassin 97, Alana. *Why Packing a Pistol Perpetuates Patriarchy*. Hastings Women’s Law Journal Volume 8 | Issue 2, Article 5. 9/1/1997. (Bassin is a law clerk for the Honorable William A. Neumann, North Dakota Su- preme Court. She is a graduate of Queen's University, Canada, where she received a Bachelor of Honors Commerce and Bachelor of Arts and the University of North Dakota School of Law, where she received her Juris Doctor with distinction.) NP 12/1/15.

The Second Amendment itself disregards women. Most notably, the language legitimizing the right to bear arms refers specifically to a "well 21 regulated militia," an institution that did not include women. ally, the Second Amendment was ratified by men 22 Even in today's media, movies and tele- Addition- at a time when women had no legitimate voice in society.23 In interpreting the Constitution, schol- ars and judges often rely on the framers' intent.24 Because none of the framers were women, women's views and voices were never heard. As a result, the absence of a female view during the creation of the rigpt to bear arms critically impacts society. Although feminist theory was not as developed two hundred years ago as it is today, much of the philosophy behind modern feminist thinking was in the making during the ratification of the Constitution and Bill of Rights and may have been available to lend theoretical commentary. Akin to mod- ern formal equalists, many colonial women may have questioned whether the right to bear arms applied to men and women equally.25 Also, corresponding to women's different voice theory, many colonial women may have been concerned with the impact of individual gun ownership on the community's safety.26 Or other colonial women, viewing female oppression to be analo- gous to racial oppression,27 may have protested the use of individual gun ownershIp to suppress race an save riots. Nonetheless, the impact of the woman's voice on the right to bear arms will remain a mystery. Consequently, the Second Amendment will remain a male-imposed law in a society where generally men own guns, use guns to commit violent crimes, and oppose gun control.29 II.

#### For laws to be a legitimate constrain on ethical communities, individual members of society must have been able to affirm such laws and have the interest of their class taken into account

Neuhouser 9, Frederick. Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory. Cambridge, US: Harvard University Press, 2009. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 1 April 2016. Copyright © 2009. Harvard University Press. All rights reserved. NP 4/1/16.

It should be obvious that this view of citizenship is incompatible with one of the fundamental tenets of social contract theory. For in setting out to derive the principles of political association from the idea of individuals who are free and equal in the state of nature, social contract theory commits itself to allotting the same basic rights of citizenship to all members of the state. No version of methodological atomism that begins with the assumption that individuals are qualitatively indistinguishable (in all politically relevant respects) can consistently uphold a view, like Hegel's, that assigns different rights of political participation to different classes of individuals. The fact that Hegel's political theory differentiates among individuals in this way may also appear to conflict with the claim I argued for earlier, namely, that the theory of Sittlichkeit implicitly operates with a conception of the fundamental interests individuals have as such and that it recognizes a set of social institutions as rational only if the fundamental interests of each, most notably the interest in freedom, can be realized within them. Further reflection, however, shows this impression to be mistaken: in Hegel's theory of Sittlichkeit the demand that the rational social order accommodate the fundamental interests of all individuals translates into the requirement that the organically structured social whole be constituted such that all individual members are able to maintain a free will while contributing in their own particular ways to reproducing their society in accord with the kind of being it essentially is. In the narrower context of Hegel's political theory this implies, among other things, that it must be possible for each member of the state to acquire a general will-to know and endorse as one's own the laws that govern society as a whole-in order to avoid being subject to a foreign will in one's role as citizen. In effect this requirement imposes two main conditions on rational political institutions. It means that the state must be structured so as to ensure not only that the particular interests of each class are taken into account (represented) in the legislative process but also that each (male) individual has available to him a means of gaining access to a point of view from which he can regard as good, and hence endorse, the laws that express the general will of his society.

## Property Rights

The notion of truth arises through conflicting ideas, way we discuss things can't be basis of obligation; must realize a gap between who we are and who we ought to be - property rights fail this conception: a. property rights might be necessary to society now, but there’s no abstract formula to determine what claims an individual has to an object, b. you can't reconcile conflicting identities to higher unity; property rights are important but we don't know what to do when two people have claims to things.

And, this isnt’ an independent framework, it’s just a contention level argument that’s outweighed by the aff:. A. property rights might exist, but you don’t establish appropriate state obligations, b. individuals constitute their identity through relations to others, not objects, since they can not form a conception of themselves as determinate without the affirmation of another, so mutual recognition comes first. C. property rights are conditionally valuable – they only matter if they fit into an existing life plan by letting us set predetermined ends, but without a sense of self they’re irrelevant, D. your sense of self is property too since it’s something you possess which lets you set ends – framework arguments prove it’s the most important property

## Sentimentalism

1. The NC devolves to the aff: A. Sentiments only gain significance through ethical communities since we define which conflicting emotion ought to guide our action, B. Emotions are not innate - you can self-regulate emotions; e.g. smiling makes you feel better; emotions are consequences rather than determinate, C. Moral sentiments are developed through interaction with others within an ethical community—sentimentalism can’t be true since babies don’t have those same moral intuitions.

Paul **Bloom 10** [professor of psychology at Yale], “The Moral Life of Babies”, The New York Times, 5 May 2010, BE

**The aspect of morality that we truly marvel at — its generality and universality — is the product of culture, not of biology. There is no need to posit divine intervention. A fully developed morality is the product of cultural development**, of the accumulation of rational insight and hard-earned innovations. The morality we start off with is primitive, not merely in the obvious sense that it’s incomplete, but in the deeper sense that when individuals and societies aspire toward an enlightened morality — one in which all beings capable of reason and suffering are on an equal footing, where all people are equal — they are fighting with what children have from the get-go. The biologist Richard Dawkins was right, then, when he said at the start of his book “The Selfish Gene,” “Be warned that **if you wish**, as I do, **to build a society in which individuals cooperate generously and unselfishly toward a common good, you can expect little help from biological nature**.” Or as a character in the Kingsley Amis novel “One Fat Englishman” puts it, “It was no wonder that people were so horrible when they started life as children.”¶ **Morality**, then, **is a synthesis of the biological and the cultural, of the unlearned, the discovered and the invented**. Babies possess certain moral foundations — the capacity and willingness to judge the actions of others, some sense of justice, gut responses to altruism and nastiness. Regardless of how smart we are, if we didn’t start with this basic apparatus, we would be nothing more than amoral agents, ruthlessly driven to pursue our self-interest. But **our capacities as babies are sharply limited. It is the insights of rational individuals that make a truly universal and unselfish morality something that our species can aspire to.**

That means finding the correct structure of a community precedes – we can determine what sentiments we want to have, the AC shapesthat

1. Double bind - either sentiments are characterized by physiological states so the standard is irresolveable since multiple emotions have the same physiological response, or emotions are characterized by something innate to individuals, but our evaluation of a sentiment is socially conditioned so 1) the NC devolves to another framework that lets us interpret what emotions ought to mean, and 2) the NC’s not normative since different emotions can be expressed in the same way, so the standard’s irresolveable

### Contention

1. Omissions aren’t innate – people are innately angered when others fail to do something they expect them to do

Brown. Philosophy of the Human Mind. Being the Lectures of the Late Thomas Brown, M.D. Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. Abridged by Levi Hedge, LL D. Vol 2. 1827. NP 4/8/16.

The first of these is Anger. Anger is that emotion of instant displeasure, which arises from the feeling of injury done, or the discovery of injury intended, - or, in many cases, from the discovery of the mere omsision of good offices, to which we conceived ourselves entitled, though this very omission may itself be regarded as a species of injury. It is usually followed by another emotion, which constitutes the desire of inflicting evil of some sort in return; but this, though resulting from the feeling of instant displeasure, is not to be confounded iwth it, as the same, in my analysis, which we may make of our emotion. The evil felt, - the dislike, the desire of retaliation, - however rapidly they may succeed, and however closely andpermanently they may continue afterwards to co-exist, in one complex state of mind, are still originally distinct. THe primary emotion of anger, involves the instant displeasure, merely, with the notion of evil done or intended, and is strictly retrospective; the resentment, or revenge, which is only a longer continued resentment, if we were to consider it without any regard to this primary displeasure, would be referred by us to that other set of emotions, termed prospective. But though, in our minute philosophical analysis, this distinction of the two successive states of mind is necessary, it is not necessary in considering the feeling of resentment in its moral relations; and in the few remarks which I have to offer on it, I shall, therefore, consider the instant displeasure itself, and the desire of returnng evil, as one emotion. To estimate fully the importance of this principle of our constitution, we must consider man, not merely as he exists, in the midst of all the securities of artificial police, but as he has existed in the various stages which have marked his progress in civilization.

## Skep

#### Skep proves the AC – skeptical objections are a central part of truth; the reconciliation of conflicting claims enables us to find truth. Proving skep is true is insufficient – truth encompasses and does not exclude its opposite

Nuzzo 13, Angelica. (Angelica Nuzzo, Graduate Center and Brooklyn College, CUNY, [anuzzo@gc.cuny.edu](mailto:anuzzo@gc.cuny.edu)) 2013. “The Social Dimension of Dialectical Truth: Hegel’s Idea of Objective Spirit.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8): 10-25. NP 4/2/16.

On Hegel’s view, skepticism is refuted when the method, dialectically endorsing that which it is meant to refute, carries out to its ultimate consequences the claim of skepticism itself. In this way, skepticism becomes an internal and necessary “moment” of dialectic, i.e., far from being the negation of truth to be excluded from it, skepticism is made into a constitutive moment of truth itself. [6] This is the objective that underlies Hegel’s framing of the path of the Phenomenology of Spirit as the coherent and systematic consummation of skepticism: the phenomenological process is identical with the “thoroughgoing,” “self-consummating skepticism” (“sich vollbringende[r] Skeptizismus” — Phen. §78), and this is the way in which truth in its systematic form is finally achieved. Truth, for Hegel, is not pursued against the claim of skepticism but by carrying such claim to its extreme consequences.[7]

## Util

### NC

1. We can not derive conceptions of ourselves or our obligations from our feelings alone – rather, we must consider our desires in relation to other actors to conceptualize ourselves or the state
2. Happiness is not an intrinsic good – it only gains value when it’s valued by something valuable – since we become value through intersubjective interactions – mutual recognition is a constraint on the moral importance of happiness
3. Happiness is a process not an end state – **Wood** means that any object that is not recognition can’t be valued, since it only reflect our present self-conceptions, so new happiness can’t be created
4. **Wood 90** hijacks the NC – happiness is only a means to self-fulfillment which is what we ultimately desire – we can only fulfill our needs through recognition since if we form a concept of ourselves in relation to objects, we can learn nothing more about ourselves and desire more objects

## Kant

### FW

1. Identity is not a priori – it's intersubjective, so the NC devolves to the aff: A. We cannot conceptualize individuals outside of the reality of the institutions that surround them – the constitution of the state relies on notions of mutual respect that make social life possible, **b.** phenomenology---we must step away from our motivations to evaluate ourselves, the only way to recognize a world beyond ourselves is through recognition of other Is, **c.** normativity---you can only become aware of yourself and your ends if you already understand who you are and understand yourself as determinate; so Wood hijacks the NC **d.** individuals are both embodied and abstract – we must reconcile particularity and universality, rather than discarding the particular, so Kant fails since it discards the relevane of the empirical, abstraction from particular needs and desires makes your framework ungrounded

Nuzzo 13, Angelica. (Angelica Nuzzo, Graduate Center and Brooklyn College, CUNY, [anuzzo@gc.cuny.edu](mailto:anuzzo@gc.cuny.edu)) 2013. “The Social Dimension of Dialectical Truth: Hegel’s Idea of Objective Spirit.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8): 10-25. NP 4/2/16.

Indeed, in civil society particularity with all its interests and ends cannot be negated. Particularity sets itself higher than the universal and uses the universal as “means” to further its particular ends. And yet, this movement shows that the individual can reach and satisfy her ends only at the condition of acting “in connection” with all other particular individuals — each of whom does exactly what she herself does. Bildung, in its first emergence, is the movement whereby the individual by recognizing that other particulars do exactly what she herself does, becomes a “member (Glied) of the chain of this connection,” is “formed” or raised to “formal freedom,” i.e., to “the formal universality of knowing and willing” (R§187). Formation-Bildung, in this general sense, indicates the very nature of the dialectical movement proper to civil society, i.e., the integration of concrete particularity and universality taking place precisely by exploiting the potentiality of individual, self-interested action. The formal universal first achieved by Bildung negates particularity by affirming it, i.e., by negating its distinctive negativity or by contextualizing it in a broader framework.

1. Individuals are co-constituted by both their particular and universal identities – the only way to reconcile contradictory notions of self is by uniting them into a higher unity – only the AC recognizes the importance of both aspects of identity; the NC’s conception of identity is empty

Nuzzo 13, Angelica. (Angelica Nuzzo, Graduate Center and Brooklyn College, CUNY, [anuzzo@gc.cuny.edu](mailto:anuzzo@gc.cuny.edu)) 2013. “The Social Dimension of Dialectical Truth: Hegel’s Idea of Objective Spirit.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8): 10-25. NP 4/2/16.

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#### Epistemology can not preclude the social – rather it must partially precede from it; self-consciousness is permeated by intersubjectivity and the objective reality of nature

Nuzzo 13, Angelica. (Angelica Nuzzo, Graduate Center and Brooklyn College, CUNY, [anuzzo@gc.cuny.edu](mailto:anuzzo@gc.cuny.edu)) 2013. “The Social Dimension of Dialectical Truth: Hegel’s Idea of Objective Spirit.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8): 10-25. NP 4/2/16.

With regard to the object side of the epistemic relation at stake in the shift pursued in the Self-consciousness chapter, the claim that the phenomenological figure of self-consciousness entails an epistemological paradigm that is a paradigm of social epistemology, implies that the “object” to which knowledge claims are directed always and necessarily reveals intersubjective interests and choices, that the object to which knowledge refers is an object that is always and necessarily already mediated by self-consciousness, i.e., by (individual and social) desire, by language, and by the cognitive and practical activities that modify and appropriate the objective reality of nature (“labor” is famously the last figure of such practices discussed by Hegel — a practice that significantly displays a cognitive dimension of its own).

#### Only social contexts gives identity substance

Wood 90, Allen W. *Hegel’s Ethical Thought.* Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/29/16.

The person and the subject are abstractions, incomplete or one-sided images of the individual human self, which are overcome only when individuals are considered in relation to "ethical life" (Sittlichkeit). Hegel identifies ethical life with "the objective ethical order" (PR § 144), the "ethical substance," to which particular individuals relate as "accidents" (PR § 145). It is above all in his conception of ethical life that Hegel seems to assert the primacy of the social over the individual. But we have just seen that free subjectivity itself is the distinctive principle of modern ethical life. Ethical life is more concrete than abstract right and morality not because it emphasizes the collective over the individual, but because the ethical image of the individual is a more con­ crete one. It addresses every side of the individual self, and situates the self in a living social order.

### Contention

#### The presence of guns and the decision to possess one prevents the recognition of others as valuable people with ends

Gubler 16. Simone Gubler, 4-11-2016, "Philosophizing With Guns," Opinionator, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/04/11/philosophizing-with-guns/, accessed 4-23-2016. NP.

In order to assess the physical risks of campus carry, we must rely on quantitative studies. But as philosophers, my colleagues and I can speak to some of the less explicit threats that campus carry poses by turning to our own long tradition of the qualitative study of violence and its role in human affairs. Consider the classroom, for example. What happens to it when its occupants suspect that someone has brought a gun inside? Campus carry poses a threat to the classroom as a space of discourse and learning even if no concealed carrier ever discharges their gun. In general, we do not feel apprehension about the presence of strong people in spaces reserved for intellectual debate (although we might in other contexts — a boxing ring, say, or a darkened alley), but we do feel apprehension about the presence of a gun. This is because the gun is not there to contribute to the debate. It exists primarily as a tool for killing and maiming. Its presence tacitly relates the threat of physical harm. But the gun in the classroom also communicates the dehumanizing attitude to other human beings that belongs to the use of violence. For the use of violence, and of the weapons of violence, is associated with an attitude under which human beings figure as mere means, and not as ends in themselves — as inherently valuable. Adapting Simone Weil’s characterization of force in her essay, “The Illiad, or the Poem of Force”: violence is “that x that turns anybody subjected to it into a thing.” When I strap on my gun and head into a public space, I alter the quality of that space. I introduce an object that conveys an attitude in which people figure as things — as obstacles to be overcome, as items to be manipulated, as potential corpses. A gun is an object that carries with it a sense and a potency that is public and that affects those around it, regardless of its wearer’s intentions. If we must avoid topics that are likely to elicit strong feeling, then there is little point in continuing with the academic practice of philosophy. We live, as the philosopher Richard Bernstein has observed, in what might be called “The Age of Violence,” immersed in a soup of real and fantastic violent imagery. And it is difficult under these conditions of cultural saturation to forswear the correctives that violence appears to offer to itself. But when we arm ourselves and enter a classroom, we prefigure others and ourselves in terms of force, as “things” — and not as equals in speech and thought. And we thereby endanger the humanist values that (along with a fair helping of verbal conflict) characterize the conduct of scholarly life at its best. In addition to these relatively abstract considerations, there remains a need for more concrete philosophical work concerning campus carry — situated work that draws on gender, race and labor theory. We need to ask: What bodies are at greatest risk? What disproportionate harms might the law visit on people of color? What sorts of psychological and physical threats can employees be subjected to in the workplace? And what is the significance of this law for academic freedom? Finally, those of us who teach on armed campuses will need to confront pedagogical problems. As a philosopher, I work with questions that are challenging, controversial and even upsetting. As a teacher of philosophy, I try to animate these questions for students, and to provide them with the critical tools to pursue independent inquiry.

#### We must consider objects in the context of the environment that they affirm – they can’t be divorced from their use

Blunden 7, Andy. July 2007, "The Nature of Hegel's Spirit.” July 2007," No Publication, http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/hegels-spirit.htm, accessed 4-7-2016. NP.

“Artefacts”: Taken together, **psyche** and activity constitute the whole of social practice, except that no social practice, or any kind of human life at all, can take place other than by means of and through the use of artefacts, material entities such as words, commodities, land, images, laws, machines, buildings and so on, material entities, whether vibrations of the air, marks on a piece of paper, constructions of concrete and metal or living organisms. All such things, which I will call “artefacts,” are material things, fashioned from the matter provided by Nature, but they are what they are only by virtue of the significance given to them and the interpretation made of them, by human beings in social practice. Any such interpretation is possible of course only thanks to the material properties of the thing and its palpable, material existence. Artefacts are signs in the sense that C S Peirce gave to the word: they mean something (an object) to something else (an interpretant).[[38]](http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/hegels-spirit.htm#n38) And for Hegel as for Peirce, the distinction between sign and tool is secondary and relatively arbitrary.[[39]](http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/hegels-spirit.htm#n39) All artefacts are part of both an infinitely interconnected continuum of material nature, and a global network of human activity. In that sense, artefacts are universals. The existence of millions of guns in neighbourhoods in the USA, for example, is not something which can be wished away and nor is it simply a matter of interpretation; true, **guns only kill people only if someone uses them to do so, but** their existence in millions of homes and hands is a material fact; the distribution of guns in the US is therefore to be regarded as an artefact, and social policy has to figure with that. Artefacts are like that: although subject to interpretation, they have an objective, material existence, and to some extent, there is always a residue which lies beyond human usage and interpretation. Likewise, vulnerability to smallpox is a material fact, and an artefact, a product of human history and society.[[40]](http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/hegels-spirit.htm#n40) In fact, the human body is in its entirety an artefact, and this perhaps need special clarification.

#### People don’t have property rights to guns – it can’t be part of setting an end since it distorts what ends you want to send, making you no longer determinate

**Selinger 12** [Evan Selinger. “The Philosophy of the Technology of the Gun.” *The Atlantic*. July 23, 2012. Accessed March 29, 2016. Selinger is an associate professor of philosophy.]

Taking on the instrumentalist conception of technology, Don Ihde, a leading philosopher of technology, claims that "the human-gun relation transforms the situation from any similar situation of a human without a gun." By focusing on what it is like for a flesh-and-blood human to actually be in possession of a gun, Ihde describes "lived experience" in a manner that reveals the NRA position to be but a partial grasp of a more complex situation. By **equating firearm responsibility** exclusively **with human choice**, the NRA claim **abstracts away** relevant considerations about **how gun possession can affect one's** sense of **self** and agency. In order to appreciate this point, it helps to consider the fundamental materiality of guns. In principle, guns, like every technology, can be used in different ways to accomplish different goals. Guns can be tossed around like Frisbees. They can be used to dig through dirt like shovels, or mounted on top of a fireplace mantel, as aesthetic objects. They can even be integrated into cooking practices; gangster pancakes might make a tasty Sunday morning treat. But while all of these options remain physical possibilities, they are not likely to occur, at least not in a widespread manner with regularity. Such options are not practically viable because gun design itself embodies behavior-shaping values; its material composition indicates the preferred ends to which it "should" be used. Put in Ihde's parlance, while a gun's structure is "multistable" with respect to its possible uses across a myriad of contexts, a partially determined trajectory nevertheless constrains which possibilities are easy to pursue and which of the intermediate and difficult options are worth investing time and labor into. With respect to the trajectory at issue, guns were designed for the sole purpose of accomplishing radical and life-altering action at a distance with minimal physical exertion on the part of the shooter. **Since a gun's mechanisms were built for** the purpose of **releasing deadly projectiles** outwards, **it is difficult to imagine how one could** realistically **find utility in** using a gun to pursue ends that do **not** require **shooting bullets.** For the most part, a gun's excellence simply lies in its capacity to quickly fire bullets that can reliably pierce targets. Using the butt of a gun to hammer the nail into a "Wanted" post--a common act in the old cowboy movies--is an exceptional use. What the NRA position fails to convey, therefore, are the perceptual affordances offered by gun possession and the transformative consequences of yielding to these affordances. To someone with a gun, the world readily takes on a distinct shape. It not only offers people, animals, and things to interact with, but also potential targets. Furthermore, **gun possession makes it easy to be bold, even hotheaded.** Physically **weak,** emotionally **passive, and** psychologically **introverted people will** all be inclined to experience **shift**s **in demeanor.** Like many other technologies, Ihde argues, guns mediate the human relation to the world through a dialectic in which aspects of experience are both "amplified" and "reduced". In this case, **there is a reduction in the amount** and intensity **of environmental features** that are **perceived as dangerous**, **and** a concomitant **amplification in the amount** and intensity **of** environmental **features that** are perceived as **call**ing **for** the subject to respond with **violence.** French philosopher Bruno Latour goes far as to depict the experience of possessing a gun as one that produces a different subject: "**You are different with a gun in your hand**; the gun is different with you holding it. You are another subject because you hold the gun; the gun is another object because it has entered into a relationship with you." While the idea that a gun-human combination can produce a new subject may seem extreme, it is actually an experience that people (with appropriate background assumptions) typically attest to, when responding to strong architectural configurations. When **[likewise] walking around** such prestigious colleges as **Harvard** and the University of Chicago, **it is easy to feel** that one has suddenly become **smarter.** Likewise, museums and sites of religious worship can induce more than a momentary inclination towards reflection; they can allow one to view artistic and spiritual matters as a contemplative being.

Double bind – either, a. the end you wish to set is imposing violence on others, which is illegitimate, or b. you don’t need the gun to set your end, so there’s no violation of rights

## Will to Power

#### Our ability to set ends and become truly free can not be established based on our ability to dominate others

Wood 90 summarizes Hegel, Allen W. Hegel’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/31/16.

In this last point, there seem to be two distinct ideas at work. One is nothing but a doubtful platitude of authoritarian pedagogy: You learn to command by learning to obey, and acquire self-discipline by having your will forcibly broken by another's will. The other idea is more Kantian: Genuine freedom and self-worth are available only to those who are capable of detaching them­ selves from their particular desires and adopting a universal or rational stand­ point that respects equally the freedom of others. It is through the second idea that we may pass from the second stage of self-consciousness (recogni­ tion) to the third and final stage (universal self-consciousness). What matters about the education of servitude is not the breaking of self- 88 ￼RECOGNITION will, but the dawning conviction that what is important for self-worth is not the gratification of desire but the dignity of formally free agency. Thus being recognized consists not in the domination of another self-consciousness, but in the mutual relation of different self-consciousnesses who identify their dignity with the freedom they have in common. Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative knowing of oneself in another self, so that each self has absolute self-sufficiency as free individuality; . . . each is thus universal [self-consciousness] and objective, and has real universality as reciprocity, in such a way that it knows itself as recognized in the free other, and knows this other insofar as it recognizes it and knows it as free. (EG § 436) I win freedom for myself not by subjugating others but by liberating them, granting thern the same free status I claim for myself. "The master standing over against the servant was still not truly free, for he still did not thoroughly look on himself in the other. Consequently, it is only through the liberation of the servant that the master, too, becomes perfectly free" (EG § 436A). Hegel's point might be viewed as an instance of the general truth that if I want to acquire worth in my own eyes on the basis of another's esteem, I can do it only to the extent that I esteem the other as a judge of my worth. An author will add nothing to her self-esteem by reading favorable critical no­ tices of her work if she despises the opinion of all the critics. Only a free being has the capacity to recognize another as free. Hence if I want self- certainty as a free being through recognition, then I can get it only from a being I regard as free. The master's attempt to achieve recognition through dominion over another is necessarily a failure, because it demands the impos­ sible: that the other be free and independent, and yet do away with this very freedom and independence in the act of giving recognition. To provide self- certainty for self-consciousness, recognition must be reciprocal. The deeper source of the master's failure is that he has an inadequate con­ cept of self. He is trying to claim self-sufficiency for the merely particular self, distinguished from others by its selfish desires and special traits. The attempt to win self-certainty through recognition for that self leads to the w strategy of domination, which necessarily fails for the reasons we have just seen. The recognition I need from others requires a different self-image, that of an abstractly free person participating equally with others in a "universal self-consciousness." By providing an argument that "universal self-conscious­ ness" is the only solution to the problem of self-certainty, Hegel succeeds in vindicating Fichte's claim that the correct concept of a rational nature must be a "reciprocal concept" or a "common concept," which I can apply to my­ self only by applying it in the same way to others, and granting to others the same rights I claim for myself. "Universal self-consciousness" means more for Hegel than the mutual rela­ tion of persons having abstract rights. He insists that "it forms the substance of ethical life" generally, and is "the form of consciousness of the substance of every essential spirituality, whether of family, fatherland, state, or of all virtues - love, friendship, courage, honor, fame" (EG § 436,A). That is why 89 ￼ABSTRACT RIGHT Hegel says that the master-servant relation pertains to "the transition from the natural state of humanity to a truly ethical condition" (PR § 57A). Be­ yond this, universal self-consciousness is for Hegel the foundation of reason generally, regarded as the human mind's highest capacity (EG § 437; NP 8 2 - 85). For Hegel, rational thought in general is possible for a human mind only as part of a community of minds that mutually recognize each other's rationality. Nevertheless, the most immediate application of universal self-conscious­ ness is to the abstract right of persons. In the Jena lectures, Hegel states quite directly the connection between personal right and the universal self- consciousness arising from genuine recognition. The knowing will is now universal. It is recognition. Put opposite itself in the form of universality it is being, actuality in general, and the individual, the subject, is the person. The will of individuals is the universal and the universal is individual; it is ethical life in general, but immediately it is right. (jfR 212/118) In the Phenomenology of Spirit the connection is indicated less directly, but still quite clearly. Hegel identifies Stoicism as the form of self-consciousness that emerges from servitude, and indicates that a society founded on persons and their rights is one that corresponds to Stoical self-consciousness (PhG f 479). The dependence of abstract right on the dialectic of recognition is stated quite directly in the Philosophy of Right: "Contract presupposes that those who enter into it recognize each other as persons and property owners; since it is a relation of objective spirit, the moment of recognition is already contained and presupposed in it" (PR § 7 1 ; cf. VPR17: 56-57).